From the Editor:
In vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 2000), the editorial staff of the Journal of
Microfinance advertised an annotated microfinance bibliography to
be published in the vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 2001) issue of the Journal.
We regretfully announce that we were not able to complete the bibliography prior to publication of this issue. We continue to work
on the bibliography, however, and we hope to publish it either in
its entirety in an upcoming issue or serially over several upcoming
issues. We hope that the end result will justify your patience.

Microfinance
Myopia
Lessons from
the Mainstream
by Kim Wilson
Abstract: This essay attempts to remove the shades that blind the
microfinance sector to the value of its customers and what its customers truly value. It proposes that the social agenda and financial
health of microfinance institutions would be far more sound if we
understood who our customers are, why they leave, what they really
want, and the real business we are all in.

Introduction
Harvard Business Review published an article in 1960 that
would forever change the way executives think about their
businesses. The article, “Marketing Myopia,” is a classic
(Leavitt, 1960). Business school professors around the world
still use it to pose a single question: “What business are you
in?” This simple query is as applicable today in the world of
dot.coms and virtual companies as it was when first published.
It also applies to microfinance.
“Marketing Myopia” looked closely at a variety of businesses and industries that faded or nearly faded because they
were oriented only to product and process. These were companies that failed to see how their customers actually used their
products and services. For example, railway company executives claimed that they were in the railroad business, insisting
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that their competitors were other railroad companies. They
failed to see that they were in the transportation business.
Soon enough, with the development of other transportation
methods, customers found better value elsewhere: passengers
defected to buses, freight customers to trucking companies.
The railway industry was dying.
Industries guilty of marketing myopia have defined their
businesses too narrowly, never seeing their product or service
through the eyes of customers. Hollywood claimed it was in
the movie business. When studios began to lose ground to television, executives were forced to see that they were in the
entertainment business. These insights were both painful and
slow to come.
Marketing myopia takes place for one reason: companies fail
to see the solution that their products offer to users. Customers
do not buy products; they buy solutions to problems. If a competitor offers a better solution, even with a completely different
product, customers will defect to the better solution. The key,
then, to avoiding marketing myopia is to see products or services through the eyes of customers—to see beyond the product
to the solution that customers are seeking.
How does a business know if it is myopic? One sure way
to tell, the article said, is to scan industry literature. If the
information is primarily technical, the industry may be suffering from marketing myopia. For example, a 1960 publication
of the petroleum industry (cited by Leavitt, 1960) might have
predicted its near collapse. Telltale articles focused solely on
production and the use of electronics in various processes. Not
one article was devoted to marketing, sales, or customers. (The
petroleum industry eventually realized that it was in the
energy business, not the oil business.)
Is microfinance a victim of marketing myopia? One can
easily check by reviewing current publications in microfinance.
Kim Wilson is Senior Advisor for Microﬁnance at Catholic Relief Services. Prior to
working in the microﬁnance sector, Kim was a partner in a venture capital ﬁrm based
in Boston.
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Most focus on the “back room” aspects of microfinance:
finance, accounting, forecasting, collections, and MIS. Some
focus on social impact and training. None focus on marketing
strategies or on face-to-face selling.
Just how damaging is our myopia? How does our focus on
the back room instead of the front lines jeopardize sustainability
and place our social agenda in peril? We need to declare war on
attrition and recognize both the value of our customers and what
our customers value. In so doing we will offer customers the
financial services they desire and deserve; in other words, we will
offer the solutions that solve our customers’ problems.

The Main Event
Let us clear any vestiges of marketing myopia with a fresh look
at our customers. We might begin with something we already
know: our impoverished customers often use cash, our core
product, to meet basic demands for food, shelter, and health,
even though we often insist they use it only for business investment. They also use cash to meet the demands of
• Predictable, recurring events: managing the peaks and dips
of income during the agricultural seasons; and replacing
the income spent on school fees, marriage, or burying a
family member.
• Crises: coping with the sudden death of a major income
provider in the family, a flood, loss of home, famine, disease,
or medical emergency.
• Asset creation: seizing opportunities to buy land, build shelter,
purchase gold, or buy important equipment, such as a granary.
• Business opportunities: starting or expanding a microenterprise.
In conversations with poor people, Stuart Rutherford
learned some very interesting things (2000):
• The poor need to convert small amounts of money into
larger, more useful lump sums. This conversion occurs
through savings and loans.
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• The poor would like to save and borrow to help them solve
a household problem or to support an income-generating
activity.
Looking at these findings, we get a glimpse into how a customer perceives the problem that microfinance solves.
Microfinance performs the service of time-shifting: borrowing
money today to solve a problem today and paying the money
back in the future, or saving money today for an event in the
future. But the key is this: money is a solution. It is not the
main event.
When attending a village bank or Grameen bank meeting,
one might spend hours observing routines, rituals, and transactions. The credit officer is well versed in each of the details
of the meeting. For the credit officer, the main event of the
meeting is the cash transaction. But the main event for the customer is how the money he borrows solves his problem. He
uses the money to buy oranges for his fruit stand, pay school
fees, pay for a proper burial, or buy a small plot of land. His
main events are the problems the money solves.

The Bottom Line
Understanding what the customer sees as the main event will
shed light on just what business we are in; the main event occurs
when money becomes the solution for a client’s problem.

What Business Are We In?
When asking practitioners “What business are we in?” we may
hear “the financial services,” “the financial intermediation
business,” “the business of linking capital markets to the
poor,” “the lending business,” or even the broad “improving
the lives of the poor business.” The truth is, we are in a sector
broader than providing financial services but narrower than
improving the lives of the poor.
Let us look at our business from the point of view of what
our customers really value. They need loans; they need savings.
But these products are a solution to a set of problems or an
4
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avenue to opportunity. How well our customers manage their
money has great bearing on how well they will manage those
problems and opportunities.
We might locate ourselves in the family financial
resources business. Our customers value the ways in which
cash, appropriately time-shifted, can help manage household
problems and household opportunities. Note that this is a serious departure from seeing our business as solely supporting
microenterprise activities.
As a sector, microfinance has been competent at the product part of business. We offer loans and savings—even if
through highly local methods—and more recently we have
investigated insurance products. What we must now consider is
the service part of our business. How can we effectively offer
services that help customers plan which products work best to
optimize cash flow?
If we conclude that our service is not loans (loans are a
product) or savings, but family financial resources, we can benefit from what Stuart Rutherford observes. He concludes that
only some of the financial resources used by the poor are dedicated to business opportunities. Other resources are applied to
household needs, ranging from emergency needs to long-term
asset acquisition, such as better housing (2000).
With this new self-definition, we might change our product slightly. Our marketing and outreach strategy might
change. Our services might change and become less generic.
Even our customers might change—from individual women to
families. If microfinance tracks with business, we would see a
reduction in attrition and a concomitant increase in both sales
and profits, results rooted in a better understanding of the
business that we are really in.

The Bottom Line
We must take the time to understand our value to customers
and understand the business we are in—the business of family
financial resources. The time we spend on assessing what our
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customers value is time well spent and will effectively inform
product, process, and marketing decisions.

Getting on Track
Recall the railway executives who thought they were in the railway business and failed to see that they were in the transportation
business? They were off the track. If we assume we are in the
family financial resources business and not in the savings and
loan business, or the microenterprise support business, we
might see that our current modus operandi is also off track.
The railway companies alienated customers by operating on
strict schedules that suited rail workers and station managers,
but not the customers, the passengers. The schedules offered set
departure times and times to buy tickets, all established for the
convenience of the company, not for the convenience of the
customer. Bus companies started more closely meeting passenger
needs. Customers switched. Train travel started to die out.
While passengers fled to bus lines, commercial freight customers fled to trucking companies. The railroads lost again.
In microfinance, most of our programs offer loans according to our schedule. Customer payments must be made
according to our schedule. Even internal accounts (village
bank savings) are not always accessible to a customer’s schedule
for withdrawing savings.
It is possible that most of our former customers are not
leaving for competitors; rather they are just leaving. This
points to an even greater failure by microfinance to satisfy
customer needs. At least the railway business could point to
the bus companies luring customers. But to whom can we
point? Are our products so rigid that customers leave regardless of whether there is competition or not?

The Bottom Line
If we continue to deliver our products on our schedule, and
not on the schedule of our customers, we will miss the train.
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What If Meeting Needs Costs More?
A 1990 study, published in the Harvard Business Review, showed
that when a well-run service business reduces its attrition rate by
just 5%, it increases profits 25% to 85%. One credit card company dropped its attrition rate by 5% and then saw an increase
in profits of 125% (p. 107). The study, written by Frederick F.
Reichheld and W. Earl Sasser, Jr., noted that in the credit card
business, a “10% reduction in unit costs is financially equivalent
to a 2% decrease in defection rate”(p. 108). Think about that:
reducing attrition by 2% has the same cost impact on a credit
company as reducing unit costs by 10%.
Meeting customer needs effectively and completely may
cost more money in the short term. Products must be tested,
systems put into place and evaluated, and so on. What happens to sustainability? If we do not carefully manage the
reengineering of a product or service, our program can collapse. One good way to guard against disaster is to monitor
costs. But we must keep in mind the powerful impact of
boosting revenues. Increasing revenues does not necessarily
mean increasing revenue per customer—though this is a powerful thing—but increasing overall revenues, and subsequently
profits, through retaining all customers.
Again, if we want to sustain our success rate in retaining our
customer base, we must return to our vision of our business. If
we see our business as providing loans or fostering savings, we
have defined our business generically. Price starts to matter. If
we see our business as providing a solution and strive to improve
the solution, then price matters less. Retaining customers relates
to price sensitivity, or price elasticity.
Price elastic services are those services where price is
important to customers. The prices stretch according to the
customers’ perceived value of the service. If customers believe
the price is too high, they will switch to a competitor’s services
for a better price or will forgo the service altogether. Price
inelastic services are services resistant to switching based on
price. For example, our root canal surgeon may be providing a
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price inelastic service. We are not likely to switch even if the
brand-new dentist across the hall offers services for a little less
money. On the other hand, telephone service is often price
elastic; if my long distance phone service costs more than that
of other carriers, I might indeed switch companies.
We hear program managers groan when government loan
programs, hugely subsidized, enter the scene. They offer
generic loans. “We can’t compete,” practitioners say. That is
true, if we are in the loan business—we cannot compete. But if
we are in the family financial resources business, maybe we can
compete. If we are in the business of solving household financial
problems, maybe we can compete. In other words, if we can distinguish our service as a better solution, we can compete.
The key to combating price elasticity is to transform
generic services and products into unique services or products.
Products and services become unique through patents, trademarks, brands and product features. But the best way to make
a service unique is to commit to meeting and exceeding customer preferences. The more effectively needs are met, the
more loyalty a customer has, and the more chances the service
has to become price inelastic.

The Bottom Line
To retain customers, microfinance programs must transform
from generic services into unique services, valued by customers.
Staff Satisfaction and Customer Retention
The service-profit chain (see fig. 1), a model conceived by
Leonard Schlesinger and James Heskett of the Harvard
Business School and published in the Harvard Business Review
in 1991, has a central premise: employee satisfaction drives customer satisfaction and therefore profits (“Debate”).
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Figure 1. The Service-Profit Chain (modified for this
essay)
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Note that customer retention is a key to profit. Customer
retention results from customer satisfaction, something driven by the perceived value of services. In a service company,
staff are the main creators of value. Staff must be satisfied to
create value.
Service company employees have ranked what they value
most: (1) good training, (2) compensation based in part on performance, and (3) latitude to solve customer problems.
Service companies have found that if their frontline salespeople, technical staff, and managers have the authority to
respond to customer problems, two things occur: (1) Staff feel
empowered, they are more satisfied, and they stay with the
business, which keeps staff turnover costs down. (2) The span
of control (the ratio of staff to managers) increases from seven
to twenty and sometimes to forty. In industrial companies—as
opposed to high-performing service companies—the average
span of control is about seven staff to one manager. By giving
staff the training they need and allowing them to solve customer problems, service businesses have found that their spans
of control can increase three to six fold. This increase far outweighs any extra costs that staff may have incurred to solve
customer problems.
Also important to the service-profit chain is staff retention.
Merck & Company found that staff turnover costs a company
1.5 times the average annual salary for the turned-over position
Volume 3 Number 1
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(Schlesinger & Heskett, 1991). This figure does not include the
cost and effect of staff turnover on customer relationships.
The concept of the service-profit chain may apply to microfinance services. The following checklist may help to determine
whether a program might be able to put these concepts into
practice.
❑ What do our staff value? Empowerment? Autonomy?
❑ What is our program’s span of control? Can we
increase this ratio?
❑ Do staff have the latitude to solve customer problems?
❑ Do they have the training, ground rules, and guidance
they need to respond to customer issues?

The Bottom Line
The service-profit chain demonstrates that staff satisfaction
leads to customer satisfaction. To increase profitability, we
should pay special attention to staff satisfaction.

What Customers Value
We have proven in microfinance that customers will pay for
services that are new to cultures unfamiliar with long-term
financing. No one in mainstream business ever believed poor,
rural villagers would pay back loans or even be able to save.
Yet clever, hardworking microfinance practitioners have
demonstrated a true market where no conventional businessperson would have ever suspected one to exist.
Now what does this market really value? By “value” we
mean, which benefits will this market pay for? Do customers
value meetings? Do they value rules? Do they value quick
access to cash? Do they value knowing how to optimize loans
or savings? What about flexible loans? Accessible savings? Do
they value a friendly promoter? Or doing the books? Or monitoring fellow villagers?
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At the heart of the mainstream approach to service is this
imperative: Examine the preferences of customers as customers, independent of operating systems or constraints.
Many microfinance program managers first look at how
they do business now, and then they see how their programs
might fit customer needs. When interviewing customers to
understand preferences, managers are seeking a fit between
what their programs offer and what the customers want. They
look at MIS, accounting, credit methodology, constraints in
promotion techniques, and so on. Rarely do they really look at
what the customer values.
To illustrate the importance of what customers truly value,
let us take an example from mainstream business. For years, fastfood restaurants assumed that customers valued wide menu
selection, healthy food, many special promotions, and fancy
equipment. One fast-food leader took the time to do a little
research and found that customers valued three things, and three
things only: (1) food quality, (2) service quality, and (3) physical
appearance. That’s all. Other features were nice but did not create value. In other words, customers did not want to pay for
these other features.
The company then invested large sums to strengthen each
of these three areas. Three things happened. First, the company became more efficient. Because it only had to focus on
three things, it could eliminate the cost of all other features.
Second, sales increased by 60%. Third, a decrease in costs plus
an increase in revenues generated additional profits of 25%.
There are many ways to ask our customers what they
value. The best way is to seek out our customers and listen.
Whatever method we choose, we must not limit questioning to
what we already offer or how we currently offer our services.

The Bottom Line
We must find out what customers value and engineer operations around these “domains” of value. This would help us
eliminate unnecessary activities and reduce costs.
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Why Customers Leave
In an interview, Michael Selbst, a marketing vice president for
BankBoston, noted that businesses built on repeat business,
such as credit card companies and banks, lose about 10–12% of
their customers a year (August, 2000). These businesses are not
subsidized, nor are they monopolies. Quite the opposite; they
operate in fiercely competitive environments. At CRS our
microfinance programs also experience 12–30% customer erosion per year. By contrast, we are subsidized, at least initially,
and we often operate in the absence of competition. So how do
we justify a similar attrition rate?
Do we know why our customers leave? Generally, we
know that some move out of town, some die, some switch to
competitors, some are asked to leave because of their poor performance, and some go back to meeting their needs the same
way they did before using our services. They go back to tucking rice into bamboo and coins into piggy banks, and they go
back to borrowing from relatives and moneylenders. It is
quite possible, then, that our biggest competitor is “goingback-to-the-way-things were.” But sadly, most microfinance
programs do not routinely perform interviews to find out just
why customers leave.
Mainstream commerce on the other hand, invests staff and
money in studying why repeat business goes elsewhere. This
kind of research has a very specific objective: to find out why
customers leave and how their needs are being met now. For
example, Staples, the office superstore, as profiled in a 1990
Harvard Business Review article, “constantly tracks defections,
so when customers stop doing business there or don’t buy certain products, the store notices it immediately and calls to get
feedback.” The article goes on to say “defection analysis can
also help companies decide what service-quality investments
will be profitable” (Reichheld & Sasser, p.109).
Savvy businesses use “defection” information to make
important investment decisions. For example, if long lines at a
bank cause customers to look elsewhere, the bank may invest
12
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in more ATMs or more teller windows. If customers defect
from a favored office supply store because prices are too high,
the company may choose to cut prices or find better value
alternatives. If customers move to a new airline because the
wait for making telephone reservations is too long, managers
may invest in a better phone system and more reservation representatives. Investments are made to improve processes that
directly affect the customers’ experience.

The Bottom Line
Like their mainstream counterparts, microfinance programs
must study what motivates customers to leave. This information
will help us to make wise investments to improve performance
and increase profits.

The Value of Customers as Income Streams
As a sector, our proposition to donors is that financial services
are essential services. Some go so far as to say that credit is a
human right. However, when looking at attrition rates of
12–30% per annum, as cited in a recent survey completed by
the Catholic Relief Services, 1 we face a dilemma. Either we are
wrong about the importance of financial services in the lives of
our customers, or we are not providing a service valuable
enough to keep these customers.
Beyond our proposition to donors, attrition is alarming.
Attrition holds us back from our mission of service to the poor.
Moreover, it is expensive and can negatively affect sustainability.
Serious levels of attrition tell us that something is wrong.
In the formal, industrialized financial sector, customers do not
withdraw completely from financial services. Imagine we
decide to stop using local banking services entirely, we decide
to resume borrowing from friends and stashing cash under our
mattress. This is hard to imagine. Because once we have access
to financial services, we will probably want them for a lifetime. Yet much of our programming at CRS shows that customers are voting with their feet. 2 They are leaving our
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programs even though in many instances no obvious alternative
exists. We need to value customers more.
The “lifetime value of a customer” is a concept that cautions businesses to stop seeing customers as transactions. For
example, a man walks into a used-Mercedes lot and is seen as a
$20,000 sale by Ed, the owner. Ed markets his cars based on
transactional thinking—using a slick, quick-sale approach. The
customer buys the car but thinks Ed is pushy, vowing next
time to shop elsewhere.
Now, imagine Ed does a bit of research and finds that the
average used-Mercedes owner purchases a Mercedes every four
years and that about 80% of this market does not move out of
town. He also knows his first-time customer is 28 years old. Ed
does the math. This first-time customer will probably purchase
a used Mercedes eleven times during his life, generating commissions of $220,000. Assuming 80% of these customers stay in
town, the potential income stream to Ed is $176,000 for each
first-time customer.
How does this thinking apply to microfinance? If programs view customers as a source of monthly revenue, then
each customer produces gross revenues of perhaps $3. But
looking at a customer’s lifetime value to the program, would it
be fair to say that each is worth not $3, but rather $1,440
(assuming that each adult wants 40 years of financial services)?
If a program holds steady at 5,000 customers but has an annual
attrition rate of 20%, then in a single year, that program has
lost $1.4 million of future income through attrition.

The Bottom Line
Each customer is a lifelong income stream vital to a microfinance program.

The Value of Customers as Profit Streams
Income streams are valuable to a business. Of course, so are
profit streams. One study analyzed a number of service industries, including the credit card, auto servicing, and industrial
14
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distribution industries. The study found that reducing defections of loyal customers by 5% can boost profits 25% to 85%.
New profits came from increased purchases, higher balances,
reduced operating costs, and new customer referrals (Reichheld
& Sasser, 1990).
In microfinance, a customer’s value over time is also of
great importance. Imagine we conduct a cost/revenue analysis
in one microfinance program. We track the monthly costs and
income from a new customer that we have attracted into our
program. During the customer’s first year, she maintains an
average balance of $75, paying about 3% interest monthly.
In that first year, our new customer brings us revenue of
$2.25 per month for nine months. It costs us $2.50 to bring her
into our program and get her ready for the first loan. She then
costs $1.20 per month to maintain. Her annual profit contribution in her first year is $6.95.
If we follow similar logic in this customer’s second year,
the balance rises to $100. Costs remain steady at $1.20 per
month, so she produces a profit contribution of $21.60. In her
third year, if her balance rises again to $125, her profit contribution is $30.60.

The Bottom Line
For companies wishing to stay vital and profitable, retaining
current customers is essential to reaching those goals.
Microfinance programs must track dropouts and focus substantial investment on retaining current customers.

Conclusion
The chief enterprise of microfinance to date has been the delivery
of credit to microentrepreneurs. Recently, we have seen growing
interest in offering more flexible services, but we have not gone
far enough. Too often, changes have been slow, incremental, and
straitjacketed by managerial dogma. Rigor mortis has set in.
Microfinance institutions lack the drive to operate creatively and
the mandate to respond to customers. Orthodoxy rules.
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Managers, it seems, prefer to please customers only to the
extent that their current systems can handle customer satisfaction. They gear systems to stem the cost of delinquency, but
not the cost of attrition—the cost of lost customers. In fact, so
little attention is paid to attrition that it is hard to find good
data on why customers leave. But our myopia cannot last indefinitely. If systems are not redrawn to support more satisfied
customers, our institutions will continue to see the revolving
door of customers spin. The cost of lost revenues will advance
unchecked. Eventually, we may run out of customers.
We must launch a full-scale attack on attrition. We must
radically depart from how we see our business, the business of
microfinance, by looking beyond our systems to our customers.
In doing so we will benefit from greater revenues and greater
profits. We must offer not just a product, but a solution. When
we solve a customer’s problem, we become an integral part of
that customer’s life.
Focusing on customers may necessitate reengineering what
we do. It may mean developing new systems to give frontline
staff more latitude in making decisions. It may mean investing
in different MIS to manage loans and savings that support the
full complement of a household’s financial needs. Whatever it
means, if we manage the process well, we will most likely see an
increase in growth. Customers will stay with us longer. They
will refer new customers to us. We will spread initial marketing
costs over more and more people. We will hold on to our more
profitable customers, those with higher balances, and will benefit from the revenues they bring. But most important, focusing
on our customers places our mission front and center, giving us
a greater promise of offering the poor the services they value.
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Notes
1. These figures are based on CRS Poverty Lending Status reports and
reports from several organizations during the SEEP 2000 annual meeting.
2. CRS Poverty Lending Status reports (1998–2000) indicate attrition levels
of at least 12% and usually more. Some organizations report up to 30% but are
really “not sure” because attrition is not tracked.
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Performance
Measures for
Microenterprise in
the United States
by Karen Doyle
and Jerry Black
Abstract: Microenterprise, while currently serving a small number of
America’s poor, is often the only option—other than receiving welfare—for
a variety of individuals to improve their standard of living or quality of life.
MicroTest, a project of the Aspen Institute, was created to improve the
value of microenterprise services and the stability of microenterprise organizations over time by perfecting and promoting the use of measures to
regularly assess performance. This article proposes a performance measurement framework for U.S. microenterprise development programs.
The following key categories of outputs and outcomes can be used to
assess the performance of microenterprise development providers:
• Reaching Target Groups
• Scale
• Program Services
• Program Services Performance
• Costs, Efficiency, and Sustainability
• Institutional Capacity and Financial Condition
• Outcomes and Impact
As the microenterprise field matures, there is a growing need for some
level of standardization in these performance assessments. However, there
is a need to balance the simplicity and accessibility of standardization with
the diversity of this field. The performance measurement framework
described in this article begins the process of determining excellence among
distinct strategies, targeted to different populations, and implemented in
unique socioeconomic environments by a broad range of microenterprise
development organizations.

Journal of Microfinance

Introduction
Microenterprise development is one of the more flexible tools
available to low-income families who want to better their standard of living or quality of life. While it is but a small piece of
the puzzle in terms of mitigating the country’s wealth disparity, microenterprise can be one of the only options, other than
receiving welfare, for a variety of individuals at certain times
in their lives. For example, self-employment may be one of the
few viable options for the following people:
• An individual struggling to find living-wage employment in
an economically depressed area.
• A non-English speaking but skilled or educated immigrant.
• A dislocated worker affected by lay-offs.
• A disabled person who has been constrained from finding
traditional employment.
• A minimum-wage worker, probably holding down several
jobs, who sees no other chance to climb out of poverty.
• A single mother who cannot afford reliable childcare or
chooses to work from home while raising children.
Because these potential microentrepreneurs are at critical
periods in their lives, it is imperative not to waste their time,
limited resources, and motivation with inefficient or minimally helpful programs. Poor Americans are among the busiest
members of the population, often holding down multiple jobs,
perhaps working in a business on the side or attending classes
in hopes of competing for a better job. It is critical that
microenterprise development programs regularly assess the
extent to which they are efficient and effective in working
Karen Doyle is the Director of Special Projects at the Aspen Institute’s Economic
Opportunities Program. She focuses on fundraising, project design, and external relations for the EOP and manages learning assessments for its Fund for Innovation,
Effectiveness, Learning and Dissemination (FIELD).
Jerry Black is a Program Manager at the Aspen Institute’s Economic
Opportunities Program. He manages two projects related to microenterprise development: MicroTest, a national performance measurement and outcomes monitoring project that currently includes over 50 microenterprise practitioners; and a project to
improve the management information systems of microenterprise programs.
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with these individuals. In recognition of this, microenterprise
program directors who were collaborating with the Aspen
Institute’s Economic Opportunities Program created MicroTest, a working group of practitioners from around the country who are committed to documenting and improving the
performance of the U.S. microenterprise industry.
This article describes MicroTest and then, using the
MicroTest philosophy, process, and system of measures as a
base, proposes a performance measurement framework for
U.S. microenterprise programs.

The MicroTest Model
MicroTest’s long-term purpose is to improve the quality of
microenterprise services and the stability of microenterprise
organizations over time by perfecting and promoting the use of
measures to regularly assess performance. The MicroTest
practitioner-led steering committee contends that performance
standards that are embraced and used will increase quality
throughout the field, will increase the availability of efficient
and effective microenterprise services, and will help investors
and policymakers discern accurately what is an excellent
microenterprise program. The Aspen Institute’s Microenterprise Fund for Innovation, Effectiveness, Learning, and
Dissemination (FIELD) manages MicroTest. A steering committee of seven practitioners from around the country advise
and guide the effort.
From an initial cohort of 13 programs in 1997, MicroTest
has grown to 54 Practitioner Member agencies. Although a
strictly voluntary effort, membership in MicroTest has been
competitive. This selection process has emphasized each
agency’s (1) organizational track record; (2) interest in performance measures; (3) motivation to participate in a learning
effort with industrywide implications; and (4) in-house information gathering capacity.
The primary task of the original cohort was to develop,
define, and test a set of performance measures for the field. The
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cohort was composed of one or two staff people, typically the
executive director and the evaluation manager, who participated in this initial effort. The first step was to collect one
month’s worth of program data on measures proposed by the
Aspen facilitators. As issues on definitions and data collection
methods arose, group members posted questions to each other
on an electronic listserv moderated by Aspen staff. They also
used the listserv to comment on the usefulness of the proposed measures and to propose additional measures. Each
agency emailed the data to the Aspen Institute, where staff
ensured that it was collected in a manner consistent with that
of the rest of the group. Issues that were easy to resolve were
discussed over the listserv. More complex issues and decisions
on measure definitions were discussed only in person at semiannual meetings. Every other month, the Aspen facilitators
proposed new measures for the group to discuss, test, and
refine. After a year, the agencies had learned how to collect
data consistently on all the refined measures. They then completed a data test for the 1998 fiscal year on the entire set of
measures. Aspen presented this data in aggregate form to the
group at a meeting, so that the practitioners could reflect
on what the data told them and make the final decisions on
which MicroTest measures were useful and appropriate, and
which should be changed or eliminated.
The MicroTest process benefited greatly from an explicit
trust agreement among all MicroTest members and Aspen facilitators. This oral agreement stated that no MicroTest member
(including facilitators) would share data or information about
another program outside of the group, and that data collection
tools would not be circulated until they had been tested and
endorsed. This agreement, as well as the absence of funders in
the room, fostered honesty and candor about programs’ difficulties in collecting data and in implementing their programs.
The ability to talk openly about their programs’ challenges with
other program managers was deemed a welcome and invaluable
tool for improving program quality and efficiency.
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While the MicroTest process has been more time-consuming
on the front end than other efforts to develop performance
measures, it has enjoyed tremendous support and input from
the practitioner community. It is they who are most affected
by performance measurement and who know best the reality
of delivering microenterprise services to a variety of populations. Additionally, the process of testing and debating how an
entire field should be measured created a structure for identifying and debating potential best practices and for defining
success across the field. Lastly, individual MicroTest members
report an increased capacity to use data as a decision-making
tool to improve their programs. One of MicroTest’s steering
committee members, Eloise Vitelli (Maine Centers for Women,
Work, and Community, personal communication) explains:
Participation in the MicroTest Core Group has proven
to be both an inspiration to me personally and a source
of very practical benefits to our organization as a
whole. . . .Exchanging ideas and experiences with a
cross-section of my peers in developing and testing the
Measures continues to enrich my work in microenterprise development. What makes it work for me is
the strong underlying commitment of everyone
involved to provide quality programs and services. We
may not have all the answers yet about what makes a
quality microenterprise program, but we are beginning
to ask many of the right questions.

The Context of Performance Measurement
Microenterprise development, more than traditional development services, has been affected by the rise in performance
measurement of the last fifteen years. Government mandates
and public sector funders typically provide the impetus for
performance measurement of development programs. With
respect to microenterprise development, the federal and state
governments have indeed played a significant role in the drive
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for better performance data. Yet just as significant has been the
role of the U.S. practitioner community and private foundations.
Practitioners, hoping to attract bank partners and needing to
demonstrate increasingly efficient operations to ensure ongoing
subsidy, launched the MicroTest initiative and various statelevel efforts to devise appropriate performance measures.
These practitioners were further motivated by the likelihood
that performance data would clarify whether comparisons
being made between U.S. microenterprise development programs and developing world microfinance programs were
valid. 1 The private foundations, on the other hand, have promoted the need for performance measurement because these
funders need information to help them determine whether
microenterprise is a promising strategy for advancing their
objectives. As discussed below, these objectives vary widely.
In the 1980s, microenterprise assistance was introduced in
the U.S. as a new strategy for accomplishing a range of distinct
goals. Among these goals were the creation of jobs among dislocated workers and the unemployed; improving the economic
self-sufficiency of poor families; transitioning welfare recipients to self-employment; and increasing the collective assets of
poor communities. Piloting this untested approach, early
microenterprise development programs were funded as demonstration projects with accompanying independent and externally managed evaluations. Therefore, the earliest performance
measures (used by evaluators on just a few of the early programs) mirrored the values and goals of disparate government
and private funders.
Even though the field has matured—yielding a surge in the
number of performance measures in use—the state of performance measurement for microenterprise remains fragmented
and is indeed bewildering for the majority of programs. Only
very recently are there nascent discussions about attempts to
coordinate general reporting requirements, and perhaps, specific performance measures at the federal level. Practitioners,
recognizing that the need for performance data is growing,
24
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have expressed their strong desire for a universal performance
measurement framework through which measures capturing
similar information can be consolidated or coordinated. 2 At
the same time, practitioners are concerned that this framework
be sufficiently comprehensive to allow for the breadth of
microenterprise outcomes and strategies.

A Proposed Framework for Microenterprise
Performance Assessment
The following is a conceptual framework of performance measurement categories. It presents key categories of outputs and
outcomes by which microenterprise development providers can
assess their performance. The framework draws heavily on the
MicroTest Key Performance Areas, as well as on ACCION
International’s work on performance standards for its U.S.
Network, the National Community Capital Association’s Best
Practices Project, and a review (Doyle, 2000) of other state and
federal reporting systems. While not every category is appropriate for every program, this framework captures the “pillars” of
microenterprise performance. It is meant to remind one of the
range of performance areas and to mitigate the tendency to evaluate complex program(s) according to unidimensional criteria.
An organization’s leadership can then decide what is relevant.
Whatever framework is ultimately used to guide performance
measurement, it must be comprehensive enough so that data can
be understood and are not isolated from other pertinent information. Where possible, preliminary data from MicroTest are
provided in order to relate the framework to practice.
The key categories are
• Reaching Target Groups
• Scale
• Program Services
• Program Services Performance
• Costs, Efficiency, and Sustainability
• Institutional Capacity and Financial Condition
• Outcomes and Impact
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Reaching Target Groups: Low-Income Clients
This first category of measures helps answer the question
“Whom is the program actually serving?” Most microenterprise
programs describe a target population that reflects their overall
program mission. Therefore, another set of questions that this
category of measures sheds some light on is “Is the program fulfilling its mission? Is the program offering services attractive to
and accessible by the individuals whom the organization has
identified as its target population?” The target group measures
are evaluated in light of an organization’s operating context and
mission. One would expect to see a program with a povertyalleviation mission serving a significant number of low- and very
low-income individuals, while a program focused on community
economic development may serve some moderate income individuals to meet business development or job creation goals.
Table 1 shows targeting data from fiscal year 1999 for 41
MicroTest programs. The first column shows data on all
MicroTest programs. The second and third columns show data
for two groups, depending on the extent to which programs
report serving low-income individuals whose household
income puts them at or below 150% of the national poverty
line (according to guidelines established by the Department of
Health and Human Services) and as determined by staff of the
microenterprise program at the time each client enters that
program.
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Table 1. Low-Income Clients Served
All
Programs
(n = 41)

Programs
serving ≥40%
low income
(n = 19)

Programs
serving <40%
low income
(n = 22)

Median % of total clients
Low-income
(≤ 100% HHS
guidelines)

27%

36%

16%

Low-income
(≤ 150% HHS
guidelines)

38%

55%

29%

Low-income
(≤ 80% HUD
guidelines)

61%

78%

52%

Income and poverty guidelines established by the government are based either on local area median income or on criteria
that are widely acknowledged as inadequate—resulting in underrepresentation of the number of poor in the U.S. Thus, the
MicroTest group chose to report the number of clients who are
low-income based on three sets of guidelines. The number and
percent of clients at or below 100% of HHS poverty guidelines
reflects clients who everyone would agree are poor—their
incomes are acknowledged to be at or below what is considered
subsistence level. There is a widespread sentiment that this particular poverty guideline is set so low that, used as the sole yardstick, it would seriously undercount the number of economically
disadvantaged people who are reached by many microenterprise
programs. As a result, MicroTest members chose to report the
number and percent of clients at or below 150% of HHS poverty as
well, enabling a fuller picture of the number of poor served.
Finally, there is controversy over the use of a poverty measure
that does not recognize cost of living differentials. The
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Department of Housing & Urban Development’s (HUD) local
area median income is a proxy for this variability. The
MicroTest members added the number and percent of clients whose
incomes are at or below 80% of HUD local area median income as
the final income measure.
In isolation, poverty-targeting information does not tell us
much, other than, of course, how many low-income people are
being reached with microenterprise development services. But if
we look at other areas of performance and relate them to
poverty targeting, then we start to have something interesting to
study and understand. For example, does serving a high percentage of very poor clients seem important in terms of a program’s ability to make a lot of loans or attract more trainees
(i.e., achieve scale)? What are the cost implications of targeting a
high percentage of very poor clients? Do loans to the very poor
require more staff time to make and monitor? Are they riskier
in terms of loan losses?
While answers to these questions cannot be based on one
year’s data, the 1999 MicroTest data indicates some tentative relationships worth mentioning. There does seem to be a relationship
between serving a high percentage of low-income clients and performance indicators related to the loan portfolio quality of a
microenterprise program. This relationship is indicated in Table 2.
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Table 2. Low-Income Clients and Loan Portfolio Quality
All MicroTest
programs
(n = 41)

Programs serving
≥40% low income
(n = 19)

Programs serving
< 40% low income
(n = 22)

Median number
Number of loans
outstanding as of
end of FY99

49

39

59

Percentage of
portfolio loaned
to start-ups

37%

61%

36%

Restructured loan rate

9%

20%

5%

Loan loss rate

4%

9%

3%

Total portfolio at risk

12%

13%

11%

Of the 41 MicroTest programs reporting credit performance
information, 19 of them serve at least 40% low-income clients
and 22 serve less than 40% low-income clients. While the above
information conceals a range of performance in both groups
(i.e., there are poverty-focused programs whose portfolio quality figures are quite excellent), some fairly strong differences
show up in MicroTest data. It is possible, for example, that lending to a high percentage of low-income individuals also entails
lending to a high percentage of start-up microenterprises. Given
the bumpy road most start-up businesses follow, it is not surprising that this sort of lending also tends to involve more work
restructuring those loans to deal with the bumps, fits, and starts
that characterize the path of a start-up business. The restructured loan rate for MicroTest programs that target a high percentage of low-income people is four times as high as the rate for
MicroTest programs that do not serve as many low-income
clients with credit products. Poverty-focused lending programs
also experience loan losses at a higher rate than other programs.
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Reaching Target Groups: Women and Minority Clients
In the microenterprise field’s brief history in the U.S., a number of programs have been established that focus on serving
women or ethnic or racial minority populations. Two of the
MicroTest measures (number and percent women clients and
number and percent minority clients) allow a program to measure its outreach to minorities and women, both groups
believed to have enjoyed less access to formal business assistance institutions. Table 3 shows targeting information by gender and minority status for all MicroTest programs, grouped
together in three ways: whether the programs primarily deliver
credit or training, whether they serve a higher or lower percentage of low income clients, and whether the program is considered young (less than 6 years old) or older (6 years or older.)
Table 3. Outreach to Women and Minorities
All
Credit Training
programs programs programs
(n=43)
(n=18)
(n=25)

≥40%
low
income
(n=18)

<40% Programs Programs
low
< 6 years
≥6
income
old
years old
(n=22)
(n=11)
(n=32)

Median % of total clients
Women

56%

50%

70%

73%

55%

63%

56%

Minorities

38%

48%

19%

39%

26%

16%

39%

Again, this is just a snapshot of median figures over one fiscal year; it does not display the range of targeting data among
MicroTest programs. Many programs, for example, work
entirely with either women or minorities. A few work almost
exclusively with minority women. Within the MicroTest sample overall, however, training-led programs reach more women,
while credit-led programs reach more minority clients.

Scale
The scale category is designed to measure the extent of a program’s reach. How many clients/borrowers/trainees has the program
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served? How many businesses has the program helped to start or maintain? Inherent in the scale category is the need to agree on
another question: How much service does a person need to receive in
order to be considered a program client? For example, if one person
attends a one-time workshop and another attends a ten-week
training class, are both individuals counted as clients?
At the field level, policymakers and practitioners use the
scale category to learn the true market for microenterprise services and the field’s capacity to serve the market. Conventional
wisdom, data estimates, and recent market surveys (Clark and
Kays, 1999) identify millions of low-income and disadvantaged
microentrepreneurs, many of whom could benefit from services but who have not been reached by providers. At the
organization level, managers use measures in this category to
glean what portion of the local market the program serves.
They also use data from the scale category to build cost and
efficiency ratios. Finally, programs compare scale data with
outcomes data to assess how many people or businesses they
can serve effectively and still achieve desired goals. Table 4
shows median figures for three measures of Scale, and how
these three measures differ across different kinds of programs, as
in Table 3.
Table 4. Scale of Programs
All
Credit- Training- <6 years
programs led
led
old
(n=44)
(n=17) (n=21)
(n=10)

≥6 years ≥ 40% < 40%
old
low
low
(n=28)
income income
(n=16) (n=19)

Median number
Total clients 184.5
Total loans
disbursed

270

164

120

192

201

144.5

63

13

26

20

15

26.5

$432,353

$34,238

$70,000

$173,900

$57,574

20

Dollar value
of loans $124,500
disbursed
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MicroTest programs disbursed a median 20 loans during
FY99. The average, however, was 58, indicating a wide range of
lending activities across programs from a minimum of 0 loans
to a maximum of 541 loans. MicroTest programs provided
intensive training or technical assistance to a median 164 (average of 218) individuals. The median number of clients served in
FY99 by MicroTest programs was 184.5, the range being
19–1,244 clients served.
Figure 1. Number of Served by FY99 Programs

Figure 1 shows a further breakdown of the extent to which
some MicroTest programs are achieving higher levels of scale.
A “client” is someone who receives substantial services, and for
whom, as a result, outcomes are expected to be observed.
Figure 1 reflects the fact that most programs are currently able
to reach up to 200 clients in a year with an intensive level of
service. The largest programs in MicroTest are those reaching
over 400 clients a year, representing 13.3% of the group.

Program Services
This category is critical in that it provides programs an
opportunity to describe their methodologies, thereby contextu32
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alizing quantitative data in other categories. This is envisioned
as an open-ended, narrative description of the services offered
through the microenterprise program. A program describes all
loans, equity products, or savings products that are used as
microenterprise development tools; lending methodologies
such as peer or individual; terms and conditions; and charge-off
policies. Training is described in terms of major curricula topics, course objectives, length in terms of hours and weeks, and
providers. Technical assistance, a broad area of service, may
include one-on-one consulting, mentoring, peer workshops,
economic literacy counseling, etc. Programs describe the purpose of any technical assistance, hours and type offered, and
providers. Marketing services are sufficiently broad and undefined at this time to warrant fully open-ended descriptions.
Table 5 is an example of a program services description.
Table 5. Sample Program Services Report on Training and
Technical Assistance
Name of Course

Course Content

Duration

Enterprise Basics

Develop business plan

30 hours

Core Skills

Marketing, cashﬂow,
operations, success

16 hours

Market Enhancement

Professional development,
marketing, operations,
ﬁnanial evaluation

28 hours

Mentorship Program

Ongoing meetings with
existing business owner

Variable

Lending Methodologies: Individual Lending
Name of Loan Product: Microventure Loan
Loan Size Range: $100–$15,000
Loan Term (in months): 36–60 months
Charge-off Policies: Our board and staff review all loans on a semiannual basis,
writing off any loan that is over 180 days past due, except loans that have been
rescheduled and are performing.
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Program Services Performance
This section includes loan delinquency and loss rates—the
measures most commonly associated with microenterprise performance assessment. Measures used to document and report
on the financial performance include loan loss and restructured
loan rates, portfolio at risk at a range of time periods, percent of
portfolio loaned to start-ups, and average initial loan size. Table 6
displays some of this MicroTest FY99 data. Discussions within
the MicroTest group illustrate an inherent conflict within the
microenterprise strategy that necessitates a wide variety of measures. In order to document that the organization is achieving
balance between its role as a financial institution and its mission as
a development organization, the program should show a certain
amount of risk-taking—thus traditional financial performance
indicators alone cannot serve as useful evaluation tools. An
interesting difference that appears to show up in the FY99 portfolio quality data in Table 6 is the extent to which training-led
and credit-led programs lend to start-ups. At the same time,
however, most of the organizations recognize the importance
of a disciplined financial services program: that the median loan
loss rate for all MicroTest programs is just 4% speaks to this
discipline. Nevertheless, the loan loss rate for MicroTest programs ranged widely, from 0% to 30%.
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Table 6. Program Service Performance
All credit Creditprograms led
(n=38) (n=19)

Trainingled
(n=27)

<6
≥6
≥40%
years years low
old
old
income
(n=12) (n=34) (n=19)

<40%
low
income
(n=22)

Median Numbers
Number of loans
outstanding as of
end of FY99

49

Percentage of
portfolio loaned
to start-ups

89

33.5

48.5

53

39

59

37%

23%

61%

21%

37%

61%

36%

Restructured
loan rate

9%

6%

10%

7%

9%

20%

5%

Loan loss rate

4%

4%

4%

6%

4%

9%

3%

Total porfolio
at risk

12%

11%

14%

11%

12%

13%

11%

To contextualize these figures, one needs to examine historical loan loss rates, the size of the outstanding portfolio, the
number of loans made to start-up businesses, the number to
individuals new to entrepreneurship, and the number to poor
clients, as well as interview program staff and management.
The measures used to document program service performance
are heavily biased toward finance. However, this category is
also intended as a benchmark for other components within the
microenterprise strategy as well. These include business
development training and technical assistance, market-access
assistance, matched savings programs, economic-literacy training, and credit, legal, or personal counseling. While portfolio
performance indicators are well developed, it has been much
more difficult to create useful measures for nonfinancial
microenterprise services. One challenge, for example, is how
to measure the collective performance of distinct training
programs. Other services, such as market access and economic
literacy programs, are still new within microenterprise develVolume 3 Number 1
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opment, as are corresponding efforts to define performance
measures for these services.
While programs view these services as critical to their
clients’ success, there have been few efforts to assess their effectiveness rigorously. Experience has largely focused on a set of
measures applied during or at course completion, including
comparing enrollment and graduation rates; pre- and postcourse knowledge testing; the successful production of business
plans; and satisfaction surveys. About 75% of MicroTest program clients who enroll in a training program complete it, and
complete business plans (see Table 7). Programs also have used
indirect measures of demand, such as willingness to pay some
portion of training or technical assistance costs as evidence that
clients value their services (Edgecomb, 1999).
Table 7. Performance of Training Programs
All
programs
(n=31)

Credit- Training- Younger Older ≥40%
led
led
(n=7) (n=17)
low
(n=6)
(n=18)
income
(n=11)

<40%
low
income
(n=12)

Median % of total scheduled to complete
Training
completion rates

74%

72%

74%

76%

74%

69%

91%

Business plan
completion rates

75%

91%

71%

95%

75%

72%

86%

Attrition does not appear to be a serious problem among
MicroTest programs that offer classes to their clients. The one
notable difference that shows up is the disparity in training
completion between programs serving different proportions of
low-income clients. Not surprisingly, this difference supports
common assumptions among practitioners that vulnerable life
circumstances can make regular attendance over an extended
period of weeks at a training course problematic. In general,
however, the strength of these completion rates should be
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understood as one of the strengths of the microenterprise
field—those who are reached with microenterprise development services tend to get a lot out of them and to stick with
them as long as they can.

Costs, Efficiency, and Sustainability
This category contains essential and interdependent measures for
assessing microenterprise performance. Program-level financial
information is needed to calculate the cost, efficiency, and sustainability ratios. The cost figures help us make rough comparisons of the investment that was required to train one client,
assist one business, disburse one loan, serve one participant, etc.
Both public and private sector investors are keenly interested in
cost data. Moreover, efficiency and cost ratios can serve as
“wake-up calls” to program managers who need to restructure
inefficient aspects of operations.
The sustainability ratios yield a sense of the current level
of cost recovery from program income, as well as the level of
funding diversification achieved by the program. The term
“sustainability” is used in the U.S. context, as is “self-sufficiency,”
for two reasons. (Self-sufficiency, in simple terms, refers to a
program being fully self-financing.) First, programs operating
in this economy face exceedingly high barriers to selfsufficiency. Second, client demand necessitates a focus on business development services as well as on financing services.
While a few highly successful institutions—ones that concentrate on lending and target existing business owners—have
attained or are nearing self-sufficiency of their lending operations, it is doubtful that the majority of programs in the U.S.
will achieve full financial self-sufficiency. The levels of operational self-sufficiency achieved by MicroTest programs as of
the end of FY99 ranged from 0 % to 95%, with a median level
of 14 % (see Table 8).
Over 20% of all MicroTest programs are generating at least
25% of their total funding from their lending and training activities. This includes training-program cost recovery, which ranges
from 0% to 21%.
Volume 3 Number 1

37

Journal of Microfinance

Table 8. Operational Self-Sufficiency
All
Creditprograms
led
(n=36)
(n=11)

Training- Younger Older >40% <40%
led
(n=4)
(n=18)
low
low
(n=11)
income income
(n=10) (n=12)
Median ﬁgures

Cost per client

$1,933

$1,723

$2,257

$1,776

$2,237 $1,665 $2,209

Cost per business
assisted

$2,270

$1,750

$2,783

$1,893

$2,582 $1,936 $2,564

$949

$738

$1,426

$1,098

Cost of training
per client

$805

$752

$880
1.2

Operational cost rate

0.9

0.7

1.9

2.6

0.9

1.4

Operational
self-sufﬁciency

14%

25%

14%

6%

23%

20% 17%

While the median cost per client is $1,933 for FY99, as
Table 8 shows, the median does not take into account the wide
range of costs across all programs. The lowest cost cluster of programs (the 20 th percentile) have costs that hover at $1,163 per
client or less. The highest cost cluster (or 80 th percentile) of programs indicate a cost per client of $2,822 or more per client.
In order to be able to see even more clearly the distribution of client costs, Figure 2 shows the frequency of programs
with various client costs. It is clear that although the majority
of programs are clustered around $2,000, there are quite a
number with lower client costs and a small number of outlier
programs with significantly higher costs per client.
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Figure 2. Client Cost for FY99

Figure 3. Training Costs for FY99

Volume 3 Number 1

39

Journal of Microfinance

Figure 3 shows the range of training costs per MicroTest
program. While the average and median figures for cost per
training/TA client are $1,334 and $949 respectively, the frequency distribution indicates the range of figures for this
measure. There are two outliers with significant training costs;
however, the majority of the programs cluster between $50 and
$2,450 cost per training client.

Institutional Capacity and Financial Condition
This category relates to the strength and solidity of the program and institution in which a microenterprise program is
housed. As with the previous category, these are measures that
assess management quality rather than programmatic quality.
Many microenterprise development programs are housed
within community development financial institutions (CDFIs.)
Through its Best Practices Project, an effort to strengthen the
CDFI field, the National Community Capital Association identified fifteen “Performance Principles”—fundamental attributes
and core competencies that foster strong performance.
Performance principles are grouped in four strategic areas:
Mission and Strategy; Market and Programs; Human Resources;
and Finance and Information. Here are a few illustrative examples:
• The CDFI is visible in its market and leverages its visibility to further its mission.
• The CDFI has leadership, a set of core values, and an institutional
culture that supports its mission.
• The CDFI has a board of directors and governance structure that
furthers the organization’s mission, fosters institutional strength,
and ensures accountability to the public.
• The CDFI manages its affairs in accord with sound ﬁnancial practices and applicable statutory requirements to achieve its purposes,
promote institutional strength, and be accountable to its investors
and funders.
Financial condition measures relate to the overall ﬁnancial condition of the organization; they are ones that assess management
40
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quality rather than programmatic quality. They include an examination of the organization’s net worth, net operating income, capital adequacy, and leverage. This category encourages
microenterprise organizations to think about capital structure and
reserve policies. Several of these kinds of ratios are derived from an
organization’s balance sheet and are relevant for any nonproﬁt
organization; others are geared to lenders only, speciﬁcally to those
with high loan volume or heavily capitalized portfolios (Klein, J.,
memo to MicroTest core group, April 14, 1998). Examples of ﬁnancial condition measures include capital structure, net operating
income, and loss reserves.

Outcomes and Impact
Most microenterprise programs are founded with some variation of an economic or community development mission or
as a poverty-alleviation strategy. Programs and their funders
are critically concerned with business and job creation, income
generation, and other outcomes measurable at the level of the
individual, the business, the community, or the economy.
Measuring these outcomes requires establishing a baseline and
then following up to remeasure over time. For example, a
poverty alleviation program that collects information on
household income and family size showing that a client is poor
upon enrollment in the program would have to update this
data at a determined period after program participation to
know whether the client escaped poverty. This type of ongoing
data collection is known as outcome monitoring, and most community-based enterprise programs find it difficult to do on a
consistent basis. Collecting this type of data requires mail,
telephone, or in-person surveys or interviews that can be
expensive and time consuming. Because most programs do
not have staff designated for evaluation activities, they hire
evaluation firms to conduct queries of samples of their clients
when required by funders.
Because of strong interest in collecting outcomes data,
MicroTest has developed several instruments that support
simple client tracking. These are being tested now by select
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members of the MicroTest working group. The intent of this
future outcomes work is to develop a simple annual process
that mirrors the overall performance measurement exercise,
providing some simple and key data to give program managers
and program funders insight into program effectiveness.

Conclusion
The broad appeal of microenterprise development has resulted
in many funders (and particularly those concerned with assisting low-income Americans to achieve economic self-sufficiency)
carving out a place for microenterprise development within
their overall community economic development strategies.
This has also resulted in a variety of performance measurement
systems, each representing the unique cultures and missions of
the funding program and its implementing partners. However,
as the field has matured and as we learn more about its successes
and problems, there is a growing consensus that some level of
standardization in performance assessment is sorely needed.
The performance measurement framework described in this
article can serve as a basis for defining what is meant by a highquality microenterprise program (Aspen Institute, 1997). The
ability to define, and subsequently to assess and compare quality, is important to both practitioners who seek to improve
program operations and investors who need to assess which
programs can manage capital and achieve intended outcomes.
The next step for the field, standards development, is no
simple endeavor. How will the field determine excellence
among distinct strategies, targeted to different populations, and
implemented in unique socioeconomic environments by a range
of institutional types? A rural program cannot be judged by the
same numeric or narrative standard as an urban one. A refugeeassistance program should not be held to the same rates of job
creation as a program that delivers intensive marketing assistance to existing business owners. And a stand-alone microenterprise institution may take longer to develop systems and
policies and to attract capital than a community development
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credit union that adds a microenterprise product; the efficiency
ratios of these dissimilar institutions will and most likely
should differ. In cases such as these—ones representative of the
diversity of the field—care must be taken when developing any
set or sets of standards. There is a need to balance the simplicity and accessibility of standardization with the veracity and
intricacy required by this decentralized, diversified field. In
that vein, it remains important to familiarize ourselves with the
range of performance measures currently in use, their rationale,
and their relative significance to overall performance assessment of microenterprise development.

Notes
The authors would like to thank Tamra Thetford at the Aspen Institute for
her asistance with data analysis for this article.
1. In general, microenterprise development professionals now recognize that
comparing developing world programs with programs in industrialized
economies is inappropriate. However, the general public and some policymakers
still relate the successes of well-known, developing world microfinance institutions to their support of domestic microenterprise programs. This can create
problems if expectations for U.S. microenterprise development (that may be
unrealistic) are not met.
2. While staff at the Aspen Institute have repeatedly heard this sentiment
from our practitioner partners in a variety of forums, it was formally expressed
during the March 1999 MicroTest meeting and through the Association for
Enterprise Opportunity’s Research and Demonstration Committee.
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Client Information
Sharing in Bolivia
by Anita Campion
Abstract: As the microfinance industry becomes more competitive,
microfinance institutions (MFIs) increasingly seek access to credit
bureaus and credit information agencies. The growing number of
microfinance providers in the market results in borrowers having
more access to loans, which can lead to client overindebtedness and
default. By sharing client information with each other and by using
credit bureau information on client history and indebtedness, MFIs
facing competition can reduce their credit risk and avoid unnecessary
losses. While the growing interest in credit bureaus for microfinance
is global, to date, few countries have credit unions and even fewer
include microfinance clients in their databases. However, technological
advances have lowered the costs of maintaining a large database of
information and have made the cost of operating a credit bureau more
financially feasible. Credit bureaus are now sprouting up, particularly
in Latin America, and microfinance institutions are vying for access
to their databases of information. This article presents the case of
Bolivia, a country which has experienced extreme competition among
microfinance providers, and which is now making efforts to integrate
microfinance clients into its credit information system.

Introduction
Microfinance in Bolivia has gone from one extreme to
another—from low-income clients having very little access
to loans in the 1980s to some microfinance clients now overly
indebted. Twenty-three percent of BancoSol’s clients currently
have outstanding loans with other institutions, and many of
these clients are overly indebted. The Bolivian credit bureau has
played a key role in allowing regulated lenders to avoid granting loans to overly indebted clients and clients who have
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defaulted on loans in the past. This service to the financial institutions and to their clients also benefits the general public.
Regulated financial institutions appreciate the service provided by the credit bureau because it improves their ability to
make loan decisions. Knowing a client’s credit history facilitates the institution’s assessment of the credit risk involved,
i.e., the chance that a client may default on a loan. Clients with
past performance problems indicate a higher risk. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) address this risk by either rejecting
the loan request or by creating terms that better fit the risk
profile of the borrower.
The public credit bureau benefits clients too because it
reduces their chances of becoming overly indebted. Clients
often don’t know how much debt they can handle. Financial
institutions use the information contained in the credit
bureau’s database to verify the client’s current level of indebtedness. The institution takes this debt into account when calculating clients’ repayment ability. Even though many
microfinance institutions now accept guaranties, the objective
is always to avoid overindebtedness. Regulated MFIs are in the
lending business for the long-term and therefore aim to
develop long-lasting client relationships.
The Bolivian credit bureau is a public asset because it
helps to stabilize the financial sector, which influences the
general state of the economy. The existence of the credit
bureau has helped to improve repayments from institutions in
liquidation, including Banco Cochabamba, BancoSur, and
Banco Internacional de Desarrollo. Clients know that they
will have difficulties accessing a loan from another financial
institution in the future if they don’t repay their existing loan,
Anita Campion is employed by Chemonics International, Inc., a consulting ﬁrm specializing in developing and emerging market countries. Prior to accepting her position
at Chemonics, she was Director of the MicroFinance Network. Anita has fourteen years
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even if the existing loan was borrowed from an institution
that no longer exists.
Many microfinance institutions are not regulated and do
not have access to the superintendency’s credit bureau to assess
client indebtedness. Microfinance providers have sought to
overcome this and other limitations of the superintendency’s
credit bureau by creating informal systems for information
sharing and by tapping other sources of public information. In
addition, the superintendency is researching the possibility of
expanding its services to unregulated microfinance institutions
in the near future.

The Bolivian Superintendency’s Credit Bureau
Since 1988, the Bolivian Superintendency has operated the
only legal credit bureau in Bolivia. Through this public credit
bureau, the superintendency requires that all regulated financial institutions share information on their clients’ indebtedness and repayment histories on a monthly basis. The
superintendency currently regulates seventy regulated financial
institutions, including thirteen banks, thirteen credit unions,
seven Private Financial Funds (PFFs), 1 and a number of cooperatives. The superintendency’s database contains information
on approximately one million clients. 2 The credit bureau
receives approximately five thousand inquiries per day, which is
accessible 24 hours per day, 365 days per year via the Intranet.
The database tracks 140 different variables on the regulated financial institutions’ clients and their guarantors. The
superintendency uses this information for two purposes.
First, it uses it to review the state of the economy and the
health of local financial institutions. This review helps the
superintendency determine its inspection visits schedule; priority is given to those institutions with indications of poor
portfolio quality and other internal operational problems.
Second, it uses the information for its credit bureau, for
which approximately 30 of the 140 variables of information
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are shared with regulated financial institutions to support
loan decisions.

How It Works
The credit bureau is a useful tool for those regulated institutions
that have access to its database. Financial institutions can use
the Bolivian credit bureau not only to check a client’s credit
history, which facilitates more informed loan decision-making,
but they can also use the information to avoid client
overindebtedness, a growing problem in Bolivia in the past two
years. The financial institution’s process of participation in
the data collection and information sharing includes the
following steps:
Collecting client information. At the end of each month,
the financial institutions compile financial statements and
information, including the names, identification card numbers,
balances owed, guaranty amounts, and amounts in arrears,
indicating the amount of time past due for all loan clients. The
institutions do not share where the client lives, the type of
business owned or where the business is located. The omission
of this information reduces the chance that the database will be
used by competitors to steal clients.
Submitting data. In addition to submitting financial statements, regulated financial institutions must report client information to the superintendency within ten days of the end of
each month. These clients include both individuals and
corporate entities. Most of the institutions send in their information via Intranet. A few financial institutions that don’t
have access to the Internet send in computer diskettes with the
information. This method of submission is the most prone to
problems, such as the late arrival of the information or the
diskette becoming demagnetized and therefore unreadable.
When the superintendency receives the information, it runs
an automated validation of figures and balances, and checks for
logical consistency. Once the superintendency validates the
information, it consolidates it into the central database.
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Sharing information. Client information is compiled and
shared in three ways: (1) on line, (2) by download, and (3) in
written reports. The Bolivian credit bureau has an Intranet system whereby participating financial institutions can access
information on all clients in the database. It also has a public
web site, located at http://www.supernet.bo. Checking client
histories electronically is the most expensive to the financial
institution because it requires high-level telecommunications
and computer operating systems. Accessing client information
online from the Intranet offers the most up-to-date and complete information to aid the institutions in making educated
lending decisions. A less expensive alternative is for institutions
to download the information in batch overnight. This method
of checking the database is less time-consuming, since the
downloaded database can be quickly reviewed without the
delays of finding a web page. In addition to these two methods
of sharing information, the superintendency also sends the
financial institutions a summarized hard copy of all its clients’
information. This report is not used to approve loans, but it
acts as a control by which institutions can check if their information is correctly recorded. Caja Los Andes’ credit committees use this report to review and assess credit ratings.
Using the information for loan decisions. The superintendency
requires financial institutions to use the information in the credit
bureau’s database to make loan decisions. (Managers from
BancoSol, Caja Los Andes, and PRODEM reported that they
would use the credit bureau even if it were not a legal requirement.) This requirement applies to all loan clients, including new
loans and renewals, individual loans, and loans made to solidarity group members. However, the credit check is only the first
step of the loan decision process, which also entails a thorough
review of the client’s repayment capacity.
For each loan decision, the superintendency requires that
financial institutions obtain written permission from clients to
check their credit histories. The superintendency regularly
checks that financial institutions access only the database to
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clear potential clients who have granted them permission by
manually comparing the written permission with the list of
names accessed. If the superintendency finds that an institution
violated this restriction, it will send either a written letter of
warning or fine the institution.
To make an inquiry online, the financial institution enters
a user name and password. Then, using the client’s name or
identification number, the employee can look up the client’s
credit history. Table 1 displays the online format of the
Bolivian credit bureau’s database for a fictitious client.
Table 1. Sample Inquiry into Bolivia’s Credit Bureau Database
Direct Loan History
Financial
Institution

Qualiﬁcation
Status

Active
Loans

Late>
30 days

Past Due
In Legal
(30–90 days) process
(90+ days)

Available Written
Credit Line
off

BancoSol

1

200,000

0

0

0

Total

0

0

200,000

Loan Guarantee History
Financial
Institution

Qualiﬁcation
Status

Active
Loans

Late
Past due
In Legal
Available
30 days (30–90 days) Process
Credit Line
(90+ days)

Written
off

Total

The client displayed in Table 1 has one outstanding loan
with BancolSol with a remaining balance of 200,000 Bolivianos.
The superintendency records all transactions in Bolivianos. If the
loan was issued in dollars, then the value in Bolivianos is updated
monthly using current exchange rates. If another individual guaranteed the loan, then the guarantor’s information shows on the
same screen directly below the borrower’s information. The
qualification status of “1” indicates that this person has no current repayment problems. Table 2 displays the rankings used by
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the Superintendency for qualification status. The superintendency discourages regulated financial institutions from
lending to borrowers with a qualification ranking of “4” or “5,”
those with loans in legal processes or written off, by requiring
that institutions provision 100 percent of those loans.
Table 2—Bolivia’s Qualification Status Rankings
Qualiﬁcation Status

Indicates

1

No problems, normal active loans and
up to ﬁve days past due (0–5 days late)

2

Potential problems (6–30 days late)

3

Unsatisfactory (31–60 days late)

4

Doubtful (61–90 days late)

5

Write offs (over 90 days late and
in legal processes)

Most microfinance institutions lend primarily to clients
with qualification rankings of “1” or “2.” The lender might
require a higher level of guarantee on a loan or reduce the loan
amount for a client with a ranking of “2” than for a client
with a “1” ranking. MFIs might lend to clients with a qualification status of “3” on an existing loan depending on the circumstances that caused the late payments, however, they will
usually require that the borrower pay off the loan before issuing a new one. If the client claims he or she has already repaid
a loan that still shows on the credit bureau report, the MFI will
ask the client to show receipts or acquire a written letter from
the former lender indicating proof of payment.
Institutions that want to limit their time online can conduct
batch inquiries, combining information up to fifty clients. In
this case, the financial institution creates the inquiry in Notepad
or another basic software program that operates in ASCII format. The institution then cuts and pastes the ASCII file into a
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software program that simulates the online system and sends it
by mail to the superintendency. The superintendency provides
the software to institutions with no Internet access.

Cost Issues
The Bolivian credit bureau offers services to financial institutions
that help increase their operational efficiency by improving their
loan decision processes, which can lead to higher profits. In light
of this fact, the Bolivian credit bureau attempts to cover its costs
by passing on the expenses to the primary beneficiaries—the regulated financial institutions.
Costs to run the credit bureau. The superintendency estimates
that its costs to set up the credit bureau were approximately
$98,000. Maintenance costs are currently about $31,000 per year,
not including staff time. Table 3 details the items involved in
these expense estimates.
Table 3. Setup and Operational Costs of the Bolivian Credit Bureau
Setup Items
Computer
equipment
Software—
Lotus Notes
Total

Setup Costs
$90,000

Monthly Maintenance
Telecommunications

Maintenance Costs
$31,000

8,000

$98,000

$31,000

Costs to the financial institution. There is no per consultation
cost for checking a client’s history in the credit bureau’s database. The cost is covered in the annual fee that financial institutions pay to the superintendency for regulation and supervision.
The annual fee equals 1/1000 of the financial institution’s total
assets. With this method of calculating regulatory fees, traditional financial institutions in essence cross-subsidize the
expenses related to credit bureau service of microfinance institutions. MFIs tend to have a smaller asset base than traditional
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institutions but a larger volume of clients. Therefore, MFIs tend
to pay a lower annual fee and yet make a greater number of
inquiries to the credit bureau every year. Nonetheless, the regulatory fees cover many more expenses than just those related to
the credit bureau, and in general, it is more costly to supervise
larger banks than small microfinance institutions.

Limitations
The Bolivian public credit bureau’s database is not complete. It
does not include microfinance NGO clients and offers only
limited information on regulated financial clients’ histories.
The current system tries to meet all of the superintendency’s
needs in one database, which tracks all the variables necessary
for every type of loan, including consumer, microfinance, and
housing loans. Because of its sheer size and the volume of
information, the credit bureau database is difficult to use for all
the potential purposes it could serve.
Failure to include clients of nonregulated lenders. As mentioned earlier, the superintendency’s credit bureau tracks only
information on loans issued by one of its regulated financial
institutions. The superintendency does not regulate microfinance NGOs and foundations, so their loan clients are not
included in the database. The Superintendent estimates that
approximately 120,000 loan clients are not included in the database. Some cooperatives do not fall under the superintendency’s
supervision, and no microfinance NGOs are included in the
credit bureau. Therefore, 11 percent of all loan clients in
Bolivia are not tracked by the credit bureau, and if one of those
clients wants to take a loan from a regulated institution, he or
she may have difficulty, even with a perfect repayment record.
The same would apply to clients of regulated institutions who
wish to take a loan from an unregulated MFI or cooperative.
Time limits of the data. The superintendency’s database
currently tracks only the past two months of clients’ credit histories. If the client pays off the past-due loan, he or she wipes the
slate clean—there are no long-term impacts on the credit history.
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However, clients who have not yet repaid an overdue loan
remain in the database until the loan is paid off. The credit
bureau system in the United States tracks client information for
seven years, after which past defaults no longer appear in a
client’s credit report. The upside to such a system is that unlike
the Bolivian system, it keeps any past problems with repayment
in the system for several years whether or not the loan was
repaid; the downside is that once seven years have passed, even
outstanding loans are wiped off the record.
Too many variables. The public credit bureau currently contains 140 different variables of information for each loan client
it tracks. While these variables are used for many other purposes than just the credit bureau, this number of variables is
excessive, making it difficult to maneuver the database and use
it in other ways that might be more beneficial. The volume of
information is as much as the current system can handle, which
limits the amount of client history the database tracks.
Consumer lending and microfinance are housed in the same
database. Some consumer lenders have misused information
obtained from the credit bureau. Consumer financiers, such
as ACCESO and Crediágil, began treating microenterprise
clients as consumer loan clients. They eliminated the character and business assessment process and issued loans strictly
on the basis of stated income. These institutions lent freely to
former clients of microfinance institutions, such as BancoSol.
They assumed that if the clients had been good clients of an
MFI in the past, they would be good clients in the future. The
end result was that many of these clients became overly
indebted and defaulted, which caused financial losses for consumer lenders and reduced business for MFIs. In the future,
consumer lenders will only have access to certain pertinent
information in the database, namely the salary of the client it
wishes to serve.
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Future Plans
The superintendency is in the process of addressing these four
limitations by researching alternatives to give microfinance
NGOs access to client histories, as well as ways to make its
database more manageable.
Including NGOs. In April 2000, Bolivia passed an economic
reactivation law, which allows for the creation of a private
credit bureau. The law of banks and financial entities modified
the interpretation of this law to allow the superintendency to
provide partial information from its credit bureau to targeted
private entities, information related strictly to micro and consumer credit. As a result, the superintendency will probably
continue to maintain its database of information but will begin
to share it with and include others, such as microfinance
NGOs and foundations. The Superintendent estimates that
within six months, microfinance NGOs will be able to access
credit bureau information either from the superintendency or
from another private entity. They are now studying the alternatives. One possibility is to allow an NGO, such as FinRural,
to be the broker of information for the microfinance NGOs,
which is discussed later.
Changes to the database. The superintendency is also in the
process of overhauling and revising the database systems. It plans
to reduce the number of variables of client information from 140
to 40 variables in the near future. The superintendency also plans
to separate microcredit from consumer lending, housing, and
commercial. Microfinance will be distinguished from consumer
finance by the source of the client’s income. If the loan is based
on a formal salary, it is a consumer loan; if based on revenue
generated from a microenterprise, it is a microfinance loan. By
creating a separate database for microfinance with fewer variables for each client, the credit bureau’s database will become
much smaller and therefore more manageable. This restructuring
of the database will allow the credit bureau to track more information on each client’s history. The Superintendency’s objective

Volume 3 Number 1

55

Journal of Microfinance

is to extend the time period shown in the database to include a
one-year credit history for each client.

Remaining Issues and Challenges
Some other issues and challenges have surfaced related to
Bolivia’s public credit bureau. These are issues that other countries or individuals looking to build a credit bureau system
may want to consider.

Issues
Two interesting consequences resulted from the creation of the
Bolivian credit bureau. First, the current credit bureau system
was structured in such a way that it undermines the solidarity
lending method and has added to the movement away from
group lending toward individual lending in Bolivia. Second,
some financial institutions have used the client information in
credit history files to steal customers from other financial institutions, which has probably fueled the competitive environment in Bolivia.
The undermining of solidarity lending methodology. Bolivia’s
credit bureau undermines the solidarity lending method by
tracking only individuals who defaulted, not their associated
group members. Solidarity lending works well in a strong
economy to reduce credit risk resulting from moral hazard—
the risk of loan loss from clients who have no intent to repay.
However, when there is an economic downturn, as in Bolivia
now, financial difficulties can lead to default for some clients.
The default of one member can result in a domino effect, in
which others drop out of the group instead of repaying the
other member’s loan.
Because Bolivia’s credit bureau does not track this information, a group client can refuse to cover another member’s loan
loss without impacting his or her ability to access a loan from
another institution in the future. As the cohesion of many solidarity groups eroded during the recent economic crisis in
Bolivia, Caja Los Andes took advantage of the situation by
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significantly increasing its client base; it offered individual
loans to former group clients of other MFIs for the first time.
This is not a concern for the superintendency, but it is a concern for solidarity group lenders such as BancoSol, who have
had to review their product lines and make adaptations to
accommodate a changing competitive environment.
Stealing clients. Some MFIs have used information in the
credit bureau to steal each other’s business. For example, when
a credit check reveals that the client has a loan with another
financial institution, one MFI admitted that it often issues the
client a loan sufficient to pay off the other loan and to meet its
additional financing needs. Client stealing is a natural phenomenon of a competitive industry. With or without a credit
bureau, financial institutions always attempt to steal business
from their competitors.

Challenges
The Bolivian credit bureau now faces the challenge of linking
microfinance NGO clients to its database in a cost-effective
manner. In addition, the credit bureau’s database offers a
potential opportunity to use the information to develop a
credit-scoring model for microfinance lending.
Cost-effectively linking NGOs to public credit bureau. It is
too early to assess the value of including microfinance NGO
clients in the credit bureau database. Undoubtedly, including
NGOs will be a costly endeavor, especially when compared
to the potential benefits. The inclusion of microfinance
NGO clients in the credit bureau is not very important to
the well-being of the financial system, given the small average loan size of these 120,000 clients which fall outside the
formal financial system. Given the relative costs of tracking
such information, it may be difficult to convince other countries to include NGO clients, especially if they aim to build
sustainable credit bureaus.
Using information for credit scoring. Once the Superintendency develops a separate database for microfinance
clients’ credit histories, this information could be used to
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develop a credit-scoring model to improve the efficiency of
microfinance lending. Credit scoring is a method by which the
financial institution calculates the risk and makes loan decisions
based strictly on a set of specific criteria that have proven successful to lending decisions in the past. For example, past history information might indicate that 40-year-old clients are less
risky than 22-year-olds and that it’s less risky to lend to bakery
owners than to construction company owners. Criteria, such as
age and business segment, can then be used in making the loan
decision or in setting the terms of the loan, i.e., offering lower
interest rate loans to clients with lower credit risk scores.
BancoSol has enough information to begin to analyze data
to be used later in credit scoring. BancoSol does not now have
the funds to make this investment, but management is interested
in developing a credit-scoring model for microfinance lending
sometime in the near future. Developing a credit-scoring model
is a large undertaking. It would be most efficient if it were developed at the national level, using information contained in the
public credit bureau.

Additional Systems of Information Sharing
Microfinance institutions have found creative ways to overcome some of the limitations of the public credit bureau. MFIs
have developed informal systems and accessed alternative formal systems to acquire information on high-risk clients who
are not tracked in the Superintendency’s database. The three
most common additional systems of client information sharing
among MFIs are blacklists, an informal credit bureau managed
by the association FinRural, and Siprotec, a private entity that
sells public information.

Blacklists
Regulated microfinance institutions compile internal blacklists
and have exchanged them with other MFIs in an effort to track
loan performance problems that do not appear in the credit
bureau’s reports. In particular, MFIs track information on
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clients that have been slow to repay their loans in the past but
have no current repayment problems. Credit risks for these
clients are higher than for those clients who have always repaid
on time. In addition, MFIs that offer solidarity loans, in which
group members co-guarantee loans, track members who have
not covered a member’s default. Finally, MFIs also include on
their blacklists the names of especially difficult customers
whose business they no longer desire.
Internal blacklists. Most MFIs maintain an internal blacklist of bad loan clients, which it uses to reduce the chance the
institution will lend to the same defaulter twice. The first step
in the loan approval process at BancoSol is for the credit officer to check the internal database to see if the loan request is
from a previous customer, and if it is, to assess his or her
repayment history. BancoSol uses this information to determine the credit risk associated with the client based on past
experience. This information can also be helpful in avoiding
repeat lending to bad clients who go to another branch or
region to apply for a loan.
Informal sharing. Several MFIs, including NGOs and regulated institutions, share the names of high-risk loan clients with
each other. The blacklist sharing process is done on an informal
basis each month. There is no agreement that requires an institution to participate in the exchange. However, only those
MFIs that offer client blacklists receive blacklists from the
others. The list contains only the names and identification
numbers of past delinquent loan clients, so it does not violate
clients’ privacy rights. One limitation is that blacklists are
exchanged only on a regional basis, so a delinquent borrower
could move to another region and not be tracked in this system.

The NGOs’ Credit Bureaus
In addition to MFIs sharing their internal blacklists, there has
been another grassroots effort to improve access to information
on bad clients who receive loans outside the formal financial system in Bolivia. FinRural and CIPAME, two nongovernmental
associations, offered credit bureau services to NGOs in Bolivia
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from 1996 to 1998. Operating outside the formal sector, these
associations of NGOs developed databases to track bad loan
clients with information primarily from and for microfinance
NGOs. These services were discontinued due to the limitations
of the system, given that they only provided information on
NGO clients with loan classifications of “4” or “5.”
How it works. FINRURAL and CIPAME operate similarly,
with FINRURAL targeting rural areas and CIPAME focusing
on urban NGOs. Participating NGOs provide the names, identification numbers, and number of days past due of all bad loan
clients. FINRURAL and CIPAME each compile the data and
put it into a database which they share with the same MFIs that
provided the data. Their credit bureaus offer information on
clients in risk categories four and five only, i.e., with loans
over ninety days past due.
Shortcomings. This system of information sharing has had
some limitations. It does not fully meet the needs of microfinance NGOs for client credit history information. The information was incomplete—it did not include bad former clients
of regulated financial institutions. Additionally, there were
inconsistencies in the level of participation of the NGOs
involved. Some NGOs, such as PRODEM, had adequate information systems to ensure accurate and timely data, while others did not. Many NGOs were three months late in their
reporting, which caused PRODEM to begin to report only
clients who were over ninety days past due on their loans. If
the data is not timely or accurate, it is less helpful in reducing
credit risks.
Potential solutions. FINRURAL is currently negotiating
with the superintendency to become the liaison between the
public credit bureau and the NGO credit bureau. The objective
is for FINRURAL to provide NGOs with access to the public
credit bureau and to include NGO information in the superintendency’s credit bureau. This would be a great benefit to
microfinance NGOs that currently have no way to verify how
many of their clients have loans with regulated MFIs. It would
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also be beneficial to regulated microfinance lenders to have a
fuller picture of client indebtedness. This plan is currently
awaiting official approval.
Cost to implement. FINRURAL estimates that it will need
approximately $200,000 to train NGOs and develop their
capacities to contribute timely and accurate data. In addition,
FINRURAL will need $70,000 more to improve the physical
and electronic security of the NGOs’ computer systems.
FINRURAL’s end objective is to increase transparency of
microfinance NGO information and to standardize the NGOs’
financial reporting.

Private Brokers of Public Information
In an effort to make the best loan decisions, some MFIs pay for
access to a database of public information managed by
Siprotec, a private company. As a part of Bolivia’s Department
of Commerce, Siprotec operates much like the Better Business
Bureau in the United States. Siprotec provides records of publicly available data, including penal and civil judgments. For
example, if a potential client has not paid his or her alimony,
that information would be on public record and would be
available from Siprotec. This information can be helpful to
financial institutions, which attempt to assess the borrower’s
character. For example, Siprotec has records of people whose
businesses have failed. While this is not a civil offense, the
information is helpful in assessing the risk involved in lending
to the same person for a new business venture.
Siprotec began operations in 1995 but maintains past history information from 1989 to the present. Siprotec has a database of over two million names, including both individuals and
corporate entities. Eighty percent of all regulated financial
institutions in Bolivia use this service, including BancoSol,
PRODEM, and FIE. While Siprotec has over two hundred subscribers, regulated financial institutions make the majority of
the inquiries.
Costs. Anyone who is willing to pay can access the information from Siprotec. Table 4 displays Siprotec’s prices for its
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services per number of inquiries each month. These perinquiry prices are in addition to the monthly contract fee,
which is $10 for affiliates of the Department of Commerce and
$15 for nonaffiliates. Siprotec’s pricing rewards high volume
customers as the per-inquiry cost drops with an increase in the
total number of inquiries.
Table 4: Siprotec’s Pricing per Monthly Inquiries
Number of Monthly Inquiries
0–4

Cost per Inquiry
Included in contract fee

5–20

$2.00

21–50

$1.80

51–100

$1.70

101+

$1.60

BancoSol began using Siprotec’s services in December
1999. In another region where Siprotec does not have services,
BancoSol uses a similar private company called Datos.
BancoSol uses the Siprotec service only for its small business
lending—for clients requesting loans greater than $30,000. If
the search under a person’s name and identification number
reveals some negative press or a pending civil judgment,
BancoSol will often question the client and conduct a minor
investigation to determine whether it affects the loan decision.
Caja Los Andes is using Siprotec’s database for its larger microfinance clients who request loans over $5,000.
Limitations. In addition to legal announcements, Siprotec
extracts information from newspapers and from other publications. Newspapers often publish only the names of people
involved in an incident without giving a corresponding identification number. With common names this can result in confusion, making it difficult to link a certain instance to the
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proper person. Participating institutions have to be careful not
to use this incomplete information in a way that could offend
potential clients, for example, by accusing them of a wrongdoing they have not committed.
Even though the information is publicly available data, it
seems risky to be the broker of such precarious information.
Siprotec tracks only negative publicity. Nonetheless, no one has
ﬁled a lawsuit against Siprotec to date.

Summary and Conclusions
A host of complementary instruments work together to keep
Bolivia’s ﬁnancial institutions informed about potential customers.
The credit bureau is only part of the network of instruments. Some
parts of this network are the result of the ingenuity of the country’s MFIs, which created ways to learn about borrowers when the
formal system did not accommodate needed information. Other
parts of the system, namely Siprotec, are the results of a healthy
private economy in which information is a valuable asset.
Bolivia is on its way to housing one of the most complete sets
of information on loan clients in the developing world. There are,
however, some limitations of the system, the most salient being
incomplete information or inability to access information. The
Bolivian Superintendency is working to overcome many of these
limitations, including the fact that NGO clients are currently
excluded from the database.
The main challenge in implementing changes is that many will
add to the cost structure more than they will add to the revenue
structure. To provide a system that is sustainable far into the
future, the superintendency must take costs into consideration as it
builds this information network.

Notes
1. A PFF is a nonbank financial intermediary, which is a special regulatory
category the Bolivian Superintendency created specifically to serve small business and microenterprise borrowers.
2. Some of these clients may be repeated in the database.
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India’s Regional
Rural Banks:
The Institutional
Dimension of
Reforms
by Nitin Bhatt and
Y. S. P. Thorat
Abstract: Efforts to reform India’s failing Regional Rural Banks (RRBs)
have had limited impact, because reformers have paid little attention to
the institutional dimensions of the problems facing the banks. Few
efforts were made to redesign the perverse institutional arrangements
that gave rise to incompatible incentive structures for key stakeholders,
such as political leaders, policy makers, stockholders, bank staff, and
clients. We recommend that the next leg of reforms focus on aligning
the incentives of these stakeholders by giving greater importance to the
RRBs’ internal organizational contexts and larger policy environments.

Introduction
Financial sector reform has been a major component of the
structural adjustments being implemented in India since 1991.
A key focus of these efforts has been on reforming the Regional
Rural Banks (RRBs)—India’s state-owned development finance
vehicles charged with serving the rural poor, especially
microentrepreneurs, in the agricultural and nonfarm sectors.
Originally established to drive the moneylender “out of
business” and bridge the capital gap supposedly unfilled by the
rural cooperatives and commercial banks, these “social banking”
institutions have expanded remarkably throughout the country
during the last two decades.1 In 1991, for instance, there were
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196 RRBs with over 14,000 branches in 375 districts nationwide,2 with an average coverage of three villages per branch.3
The banks had disbursed over Rs. 35,000 million in credit and
mobilized over Rs. 49,000 million in deposits.4
Despite this impressive geographic coverage and intermediation activity, however, the RRBs suffered from poor
financial health, especially because of mounting loan losses. As
of June 1993, 172 RRBs were unprofitable, and aggregate loan
recovery performance was at 40.8 percent. 5 While loan losses
had wiped out the equity and reserves of some banks, they
were eating into the deposits of others, underscoring the need
for fundamental changes in the way RRBs conducted business
(Joshi & Little, 1996; Mudgil & Thorat, 1995).
Although a series of banking reforms have been initiated
since 1993 to make the RRB system viable, recent assessments
suggest that the performance of the banks in the postreform
period has been less encouraging than expected (Gupta, 1998;
Kaladhar, 1997). While aggregate profitability seems to have
improved slightly, becoming less negative, the overall quality
of loan portfolio management, administration and collection
still remains a matter of grave concern (R. Rosenberg, Senior
Advisor, CGAP, personal communication, May 20, 1999). For
instance, accumulated RRB losses through March 31, 1998,
were reported at almost Rs. 27,870 million; losses for the year
ending that date were Rs. 736.5 million.
Some of the reports of better viability are actually erroneous, because they result from inappropriate techniques for
measuring loan recovery.6 Further, many RRBs are actually
achieving better results by moving away from their mission of
serving the poor—either by putting their money into investments rather than lending it, 7 or by lending to nonpoor clients
(Mosley, 1996; Rosenberg, 1999). The latter is partly evidenced
Nitin Bhatt is Manager with Grant Thornton, LLP’s Entrepreneurial Consulting
Services Practice in Los Angeles, and former Executive Director of University of
Southern California’s Business Expansion Network.
Y. S. P. Thorat is Regional Director of the Reserve Bank and former Additional
Chief General Manager of RBI’s Rural Planning and Credit Department.
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by a gradual increase in the average loan size and the continued
bias against women borrowers (Ghosh, 1998; Kaladhar, 1997). 8
As a result, the dependence of the rural poor on informal credit
continues to be significant (Machiraju, 1999; World Bank,
1998). This has seemingly defeated a central objective of the
government’s rural development strategy, which is to deepen
and widen the availability of finance to India’s historically
excluded communities.
This paper suggests that efforts to reform the RRBs have had
a limited impact because reformers have paid little attention to
the institutional dimensions of the problems facing the banks.
Specifically, few efforts were made to redesign the perverse
institutional arrangements that gave rise to incompatible
incentive structures for key stakeholders, such as politicians,
policy makers, stockholders, bank staff, and clients. We recommend that the next leg of reforms focus on aligning the
incentives of these stakeholders by giving greater importance
to the internal organizational context as well as the larger policy environment within which the RRBs operate.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections.
The first section discusses the role of institutions and incentives
in shaping the performance of development finance programs.
The second section highlights the impact of institutional
arrangements facing key stakeholders in the prereform era. The
third section argues that the reforms introduced since 1993 have
not adequately addressed the incompatibility of these incentives, and provides recommendations for getting the incentives
right. Finally, the fourth section draws some general policy
implications, and concludes that ultimately, political support
for the reform process will be the key determinant of the extent
to which the RRBs can be turned around.

Institutions, Incentives, and Performance
Institutions and incentives are important determinants of
organizational performance in development finance initiatives
(Stiglitz, 1990; Williamson, 1995).
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Institutions and Incentives
Institutions are key to understanding the performance of economic development programs (Lin & Nugent, 1995).
Conceptualized as constraints that shape the behavioral relations
among individuals and groups, institutions can be either formal
or informal (North, 1990). For example, they can include a
region’s formal constitution and laws, as well as its informal
customs, culture, and norms of day-to-day conduct.
Institutional arrangements, defined as specific and mutually
agreed upon constraints, have the ability to govern relationships
in social, economic, and political interactions (Bates, 1990;
Ferris & Tang, 1993). Such constraints can either be voluntarily
accepted through traditional values and prevailing societal
norms, or enforced and policed through an external authority,
such as a country’s judicial system.
In analyzing the performance of development finance
programs, it is important to examine constraints at the policy, program, and client levels (see Table 1). For example,
policy-level constraints might include a country’s laws and
regulatory statutes. Program-level constraints include criteria
formulated by board members and used by program managers
to screen borrowers, make lending decisions, collect loans, and
assess program performance. Finally, client-level constraints
take into account rules faced by borrowers and savers in accessing
and using financial services.
Each of the three levels of constraints is characterized by
players who are accountable to a set of stakeholders (the principals) on the one hand, and who on the other hand monitor
the performance of another set of stakeholders (the agents).
For example, although politicians are agents of the public, they
serve as lawmakers and hence as principals for the government
arms that oversee development finance programs. Similarly, a
program’s management might be accountable to different
owners/sponsors, regulators, and governing bodies, such as
the board of directors (principals), while simultaneously overseeing lending and deposit-taking activities with its clients
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(agents). Since these clients are part of the larger population
that elects the politicians, they also, at least theoretically, serve
as principals for the politicians.
The aggregate performance of the “system” depends on the
extent to which the incentives faced by principals and agents
are compatible (Sappington, 1991). The standard way to align
incentives is to increase the agent’s return when the principal’s
objective is achieved and vice versa.
Table 1: Constraints Facing Stakeholders in Development
Finance Programs
Constraints
Policy-level constraints
Program-level constraints
Client-level constraints

Public Interest Groups
Sponsors, Governments, Boards, Regulators
Development Finance Programs
Borrowers, Savers

Program Performance
When one considers that development finance programs are
often characterized by players at different levels of bureaucratic and political interaction (Braverman & Guasch, 1993;
Hulme & Mosley, 1996), it becomes immediately apparent that
changes in opportunities and constraints faced by players at
one level can change the incentives structures they face. This
further changes opportunities, constraints, and incentives at
the next level, and so on. Indeed, it is the “failure of policymakers to account for multiple agency problems in lending
institutions [that] bears responsibility for a large part of the
poor performance of government rural credit programs in the
last three decades” (Braverman & Guasch, 1993, p. 54).
Research by the present authors (accepted for publication in
Policy Studies Journal) highlights the need to identify agency problems. It provides an example of how incentive incompatibility
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among multiple levels of institutional arrangements can render
development finance programs ineffective. If shareholders or
donors insist on increasing lending volume and outreach, program officers can feel pressured to make larger loans without
appropriate screening. In many such instances, influence and
patronage bias the distribution of credit in favor of wealthier and
well-connected landholders, who do not feel obligated to repay
the loans. This leads to high loan defaults and lax collection
efforts, especially when the lending agency has few incentives to
engage in intensive loan collection. Poor repayment performance
often sends a signal to the community that nonrepayment will be
pardoned; and as a result, borrowers have incentives to willfully
default on the loans.
Inappropriate institutional arrangements between politicians
and administrators also result in perverse incentives, for
example, in state-owned banks. Since most bureaucracies are
bound to serve the law and elected officials, they may find
themselves faced with new rules and constraints when a new
political party comes to power and wants to fulfill its campaign
promises. For instance, if a politician advocates the delivery of
cheap credit or promises the waiver of past due loans to buy
votes, those commitments may take the form of new policies.
Bankers in turn are instructed to implement the policies at the
program and client levels, by reducing interest rates or writing
off unpaid loan balances.
Finally, lack of appropriate institutional arrangements for
punishing and rewarding program staff can also undermine the
performance of development finance initiatives (Hulme &
Mosley, 1996). This is especially true when civil service personnel policies do not sanction inferior performance and reward
superior performance in an appropriate and timely fashion.
Reports of successful development finance initiatives from
around the world indicate that staff incentive structures, especially those that incorporate proper mixes of fixed salary and
bonuses, can go a long way in enhancing a program’s efficiency
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and productivity (Baydas, Graham, & Valenzuela, 1997; Hulme
& Mosley, 1996).
In the next section, we analyze the performance of India’s
Regional Rural Banks in the prereform period by considering
how institutional arrangements and incentives have impacted
various stakeholders in the RRB system.

Institutional Challenges and RRB Performance
Institutional constraints within the RRB system might be
analyzed at two interfaces: the policy-program level, and the
program-field level.

Policy-Program-Level Constraints
The poor performance of the RRBs was largely rooted in their
adverse policy environment. Specifically, constraints imposed
by the banks’ objectives, governance structures, and business
model were key determinants of their nonviability.
Objectives

The original objective of the RRBs was to bring progress with
social justice to the rural poor, who were generally denied
access to financial services from rural cooperatives as well as
commercial banks (Machiraju, 1999). The rationale was that
during the 60s and 70s, rural cooperatives were dominated by
wealthy farmers, and the commercial banks had an urban bias.
Therefore, most poor people turned to informal sources for
their financing needs. In an effort to provide credit to the poor
from institutional sources, the RRBs were established in 1975.
It was thought that these banks would combine the rural focus
of the cooperatives with the business orientation of the commercial banks, to make credit widely available to rural India’s
disadvantaged communities.
Given the initial objective of policy makers to increase outreach, the following two decades saw a large-scale effort to
increase the number of banks, bank branches, and disbursements
nationwide (Table 1). As a result, the number of RRBs increased
from 6 in 1976 to 196 in 1999, and the number of branches
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increased from 17 to over 14,000 during the same period. Most
significantly, perhaps, loan amounts jumped from Rs. 1 million
in 1975 to over Rs. 93,670 million in 1998–99.
Table 2. Expansion of RRB System, 1975–1999
Period
ending

Dec. 1975
Dec. 1980
Dec. 1985
Mar. 1990
Mar. 1995
Mar. 1997
Mar. 1998
Mar. 1999

Banks

Branches

Loans

Deposits

CD Ratio

(in Rs. Million)
6
85
188
196
196
196
196
196

17
3,279
12,606
14,443
14,509
14,508
14,508
14,508

1.0
2433.8
1,4076.7
3,5540.4
6,2909.7
7,8526.6
8,4866.2
9,3672.1

2.0
1998.3
12868.2
41505.2
11,1500.1
15,4234.2
19,3256.5
23,5976.1

50
122
109
86
56
51
44
40

Scource: NABARD Reports

However, this portfolio growth was accompanied by loan
losses that made the RRB system highly unprofitable. For
example, accumulated losses amounted to Rs. 1263 million at
the end of 1987, with 151 unprofitable banks. These losses
increased to Rs. 2,1520.9 million by March 1996, with 152
banks losing money. But despite its nonviability, the RRB
system was widely celebrated in political and administrative
circles as a success, largely because of its immense outreach.
A key reason for this optimism was language contained in a
report issued by the Narasimhan Committee in 1976, which
stated that any losses incurred by the RRBs would be a price
worth paying, given the social benefits that would be attained.
The report suggested, for instance, that RRB losses “in the initial
years . . . would need to be subsidized” (Reserve Bank of India,
1997, p. 29). Since the RRBs were established on this committee’s
recommendation, most stakeholders deemed the losses incurred
by the banks over the next two decades as acceptable. In fact,
many evaluators even provided a rationale for providing ongoing
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subsidies to support the RRB system. For instance, some
observers argued that “RRBs have become an important instrument for bringing about primary income distribution. This
role of RRBs cannot be lost sight of, given the national objective
of development with social justice. . . . The expenditure incurred
on RRBs should be viewed as investment in weaker sections”
(Velayudham & Sankaranarayanan, 1990, p. 2161).
Thus, from its very inception, the focus of the RRB system
was to promote social justice through credit disbursement.
Serving the poor and making a profit were seen as inherently
contradictory. Since increasing outreach and covering costs was
neither a stated objective nor a performance measure, financial
viability was never made a priority by any stakeholder.
Governance Structures

The challenge of RRB governance needs to be understood in
terms of constraints related to its ownership, control, and
management.
In principle, each RRB was capitalized and owned 50 percent
by the Government of India, 15 percent by the state government,
and 35 percent by the (state-owned) commercial bank which
agreed to “sponsor” it. In practice, the owners, usually the state
governments, were in default on their capital contributions, thus
weakening the equity base of the banks. The lack of interest in
investing on the part of the shareholders resulted from the lack
of incentives in contributing to ownership. Specifically, since
the RRBs were a money-losing proposition from the very
beginning, the prospect of participating in future profits was
dim for the investors.
The multiple ownership of the RRBs led to a range of
bureaucratic controls. These were specially pronounced in the
case of RRB schemes, such as the Indian Rural Development
Program (IRDP), in which a combination of government subsidy
and term credit (in the ratio of 1:2) was provided to farmers and
artisans to foster self-employment.9 Although IRDP schemes
were formally “housed” within the RRBs, and any lending conducted under the scheme affected the banks’ financial statements,
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the program was implemented through separate district-level
entities known as District Rural Development Agencies
(DRDAs). The governing body of the DRDAs included locally
elected representatives at the national, state, and district level
governments, as well as the heads of various district development
departments. A separate State-Level Coordination Committee
(SLCC) monitored the program at the state level, while the
Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment was responsible for
program funding, monitoring, and evaluation.
While some “controls” from these various entities translated into faulty business policies (discussed in detail in the
next section), others resulted in a thicket of reporting rules and
regulations issued by “higher” government bodies and departments, such as the Reserve Bank of India (RBI, India’s Central
Bank), and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural
Development (NABARD, India’s apex refinancing agency for
rural finance institutions owned by the Ministry of Finance
and the Reserve Bank of India), the Ministry of Finance, and
the state governments. Many such reports overlapped in their
requirements, wasting time and effort for the bank staff. For
instance, during his field study of constraints faced by commercial bank staff nationwide, Gupta (1998, p. 32) found a
“high degree of overlap in the reporting formats of the various
government agencies” and recommended modifications in
forms and reporting requirements to allow bank staff to devote
more attention to “core banking business.” Because the reporting
requirements for RRBs are identical, Gupta’s conclusion is
equally valid for RRB staff.
The multiple policies imposed by the various government
entities led to inefficient management practices (Reserve Bank
of India, 1997). For instance, the government units controlled
whom the RRBs lent to (including sectors, groups, and often
specific individuals), what they lent for, the design and price of
products, office locations, organizational structure, and human
resource development issues (including recruitment, promotion,
salaries, and disciplinary action). Given the top-down and static
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nature of these policies, the owners’ representatives on the
board of directors, 10 as well as the sponsor bank and the RRB
managers, had virtually no authority to make any strategic
decision regarding the RRBs.
Devoid of freedom to make any “commercial” improvements
to the system, most stakeholders, especially the sponsor banks,
became apathetic towards RRB issues.11 A study conducted by
Government of India’s (1989) Khusro Committee noted that the
RRB boards did a poor job of monitoring their performance,
simply because they had no interest in the affairs of the banks.
In a large number of cases, boards consisted of political
appointees unfamiliar with the technical aspects of banking
and finance. Therefore, the informally accepted norm at the
irregularly held board meetings was to skirt any issues related
to lending policies or financial performance. Instead, they
spent time discussing either personal issues or those related to
“policy neutral” areas, such as staff recruitment (Mudgil &
Thorat, 1995).
Lack of a single owner with clear ownership and control,
and no prospects for profits, diffused accountability and weakened oversight of the RRBs, seriously impairing the governance
of the banks.
Business Model

Rural banking policies, especially those prescribed by the RRB
Act, made it difficult for the bankers to build a viable business
model. For example, the RRBs were required to maintain high
Statutory Liquidity Ratios (SLR) of 25 percent,12 a constraint
that reduced the availability of capital. Also, the yields on SLR
were lower than prevailing lending rates and thus implicitly
taxed the RRBs. Further, unstandardized norms for income
recognition made it difficult to assess accurately the financial
performance of the banks, since income on loans included both
interest that was paid as well as interest that was due. Not
knowing how long interest payments had been in arrears, most
managers found it difficult to provide for nonperforming assets.
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In addition, constraints with respect to selecting borrowers,
defining geographic markets, opening and closing branches,
making and collecting loans, containing administrative costs,
and setting interest rates were key barriers to enhancing
financial sustainability.
For example, loans were to be disbursed in the absence of
collateral to economically weaker sections of the rural population—households with land holdings less than 6.5 acres and
incomes less than Rs. 10,000—located in specific and restricted
geographic areas. 13 Banks were allowed to lend only predetermined amounts for specified lending terms. Loans were
disbursed for production purposes only; consumption credit
was seldom granted. 14 In the case of the IRDP scheme, the
eligibility criteria were even more restrictive. For example, it
was stipulated that at least 50 percent of assisted families
belong to “lower status” castes and tribes, 40 percent of the
clients be women, and 3 percent of the credit be disbursed to
handicapped individuals. The actual selection of such “borrowers”
was done not by lending officers, but by local government officials, who sent lists of “approved” individuals to the banks for
loan disbursal.
One outcome of these restrictive policies was an increase in
loan losses because of bad lending decisions. Those in need of
credit for consumption often falsified loan requests. Given the
pressure from government authorities to increase loan volume
to meet quantitative targets, bank staff had little authority or
incentive to engage in due diligence and assess the risks of
lending to such individuals. Thus, lending decisions were often
reduced to making superficial matches between individuals’
socioeconomic profiles and the available schemes.
Further, since many schemes, including IRDP, called for
the disbursement of a one-time loan, neither the lenders nor
the borrowers were interested in maintaining a long-term relationship. Even though many poor borrowers did not have the
ability to be productive entrepreneurs or the capacity to repay
the loans, they participated in the programs to access what
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they thought was “free money” from the government. In most
cases, it was the wealthier sections of the community, with
connections and political patronage, who benefited from the
schemes. These well-to-do borrowers felt little pressure to
repay their debts.
Finally, the lack of incentives among bank staff to engage in
intensive loan collection, the unwillingness of state governments
to assist in recovery procedures,15 and the “blanket” loan waivers
granted by the government further boosted loan losses. As a
result, willful loan defaults became a norm over the years.16
In addition to the high risks associated with lending, the
high cost of administration also constrained the RRBs’ financial
viability. For example, many bank branches were often forced
to remain open even if areas had sparse populations and little
potential for entrepreneurial activities. Further, a 1993 court
victory by the bank workers’ labor union granted RRB staff the
same remuneration as their counterparts in sponsor banks and
added to the banks’ already escalating costs.
While the above factors hurt the banks’ cost structure, it
was the government-imposed ceiling on interest rates that dealt
a severe blow to the banks’ financial viability. Since these rates
were fixed at 12 percent on loans below Rs. 200,000, and most
of the RRB portfolio was confined to loans of this size, the
banks were unable to charge for the high costs of making and
servicing the small loans. According to Mosley (1996), the
RRBs’ Subsidy Dependence Index was 153 percent for 1992.
This means that that the banks would have had to more than
double their average lending rates of 16.6 percent or more than
half overdues, just to break even during that year. 17
But given the high profile and political stature of the
RRBs, most observers felt that the implementation of high
interest rates was “clearly not possible in view of the mandated
role of these institutions for financing the weaker sections at
concessional rates” (Mudgill & Thorat, 1995, p. 7).
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Program-Field-Level Constraints
The challenges related to the RRBs’ objectives, governance
structures, and business model triggered additional constraints
at the bank-client level. These constraints were related to the
lack of appropriate infrastructure, low levels of motivation
among RRB staff, and an inefficient loan delivery system.
Infrastructure

Since the RRBs were originally envisioned to serve as low-cost
rural extensions of the banking system, few investments were
made in their infrastructure development. According to field
studies, for example, many bank buildings were unsecure and
lacked appropriate roofing and access to basic amenities, such
as water and electricity (Reserve Bank of India, 1997).
Equipped with old furniture and dilapidated filing cabinets,
storage space within many branches was lacking, and loan documents and records were often found stacked across the floor.
Bank staff were neither provided vehicles nor a vehicle
allowance to visit clients. A lack of calculators in some
branches adversely affected the productivity, efficiency, and
morale of the staff (Marguirite Robinson, HIID, personal communication, April 22, 1999).
Lack of appropriate infrastructure made working at the
banks, and living in the villages, difficult propositions (Gupta,
1998). Many staff members abstained from work to avoid the
adverse work environment, choosing to live in semiurban areas
outside of the RRB villages. As a result, some bank branches
were open for only 18 hours a week, while others closed down
several times a month to “catch up” on internal paperwork.
These practices were inconvenient for clients, who often took
their business elsewhere.
Staff Motivation

Given the lack of basic infrastructure within bank branches, the
lack of appropriate residential facilities in most villages, and
perhaps most important, the money-losing business model of
the RRBs, many sponsor banks assigned their junior officers—
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who lacked appropriate loan underwriting or business management skills—to head the rural bank branches. In cases where
senior managers were placed at the RRBs the officers’ peers saw
the placement as a punishment for possible inferior performance
in the urban sponsor banks. It was well known by staff that
since RRB assets were a very small percentage of sponsor-bank
assets, and since the RRBs were ultimately loss leaders, the
“parent” banks did not want to invest any significant time and
money toward their maintenance or improvement.
Therefore, officers who were posted at RRBs generally had
low morale to begin with. This was often reflected in their lack
of willingness to be innovative and entrepreneurial, as well as
in their belief that the RRBs could ultimately do little to
improve the situation of the poor.
The day-to-day work requirements at the RRBs did little to
boost motivation of such workers. With a plethora of reporting
requirements and the redundancy of multiple forms and
procedures, bank staff found themselves engaged in banal
housekeeping activities most of the time. A focus on bureaucratic compliance displaced the need to make good loans,
monitor their performance, and emphasize the need for timely
repayment. Despite the strong focus on reporting, however, it
took from three to six months for the branch mangers to identify
borrowers in default (Gupta, 1998, p. 26). When defaulting borrowers were not contacted for consecutive months, they assumed
that the banks did not care about collecting on the loans. This
further reinforced the “culture” of loan defaults.
Finally, since RRB pay scales—which until recently were
lower than those of their peers in sponsor banks—were not
linked to performance, bank staff had little reason to improve
efficiency or to “push hard” and collect on nonperforming
loans. In fact, the unattractive compensation scale created
strong incentives for corruption, which, over the years,
became systemic within the RRBs.
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Inefficiencies in the loan-delivery system resulted from inflexible
lending practices and high transaction costs for clients (World
Bank, 1998). For example, loan products were usually long
term, required balloon repayments, and were tied to specific
types of investments that were assumed to have predetermined
cash flows. Even applicants with good credit histories and collateral could be turned down if their requests did not “fit” the
various RRB schemes. Since such schemes laid out the terms
and conditions of the loan, the unique financial conditions of
applicants, especially in terms of the complexities of their
families’ cashflows and their repayment capacity, were never a
consideration in lending decisions.
In addition to inflexibility in lending, high transaction
costs also created disincentives for borrowing (Kaladhar,
1997). For instance, loan applicants were required to produce
a “no dues” certificate which served as proof of good credit
standing, before they could receive loans. Acquiring this document often took several weeks. Also, applicants were
required to submit a photograph as part of their loan
proposal, but no technology to obtain a photograph existed in
villages. Further, if individuals wanted to do business with an
RRB outside their service area, a “no objection” certificate had
to be obtained from the bank within their service area. These
practices accounted in part for the long time—sometimes
nearly a month—that it took for loan applicants to get
approved and funded (Hunte, 1996). Finally, many prospective
borrowers, especially those who were illiterate, approached
middlemen to facilitate access to funds. These middlemen
charged significant commissions—“fixed” transaction costs that
diluted the value of the ultimate loan amounts to the borrowers.18
Borrowers faced transaction costs that were much higher
compared to other financing sources. Indeed, it is not surprising
that many rural farmers and small scale entrepreneurs, who generally value convenience as compared to the cost of credit,
turned to informal sources for their credit needs (World Bank,
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1998). Further, many borrowers who incurred high transaction
costs may have avoided repaying loans as a way to shift some
costs back to the RRBs, thus contributing to their nonviability.

Enhancing the Viability of the RRBs
Have banking reforms addressed these institutional constraints
and perverse incentives in the RRB system? What additional
reforms are needed to make the RRBs viable?

Key RRB Reforms
Based on the recommendations of the Narasimhan Committee
Report (1992), reforms were initiated in 1993 to turn the failing
RRBs around. To enhance financial viability, a new set of
prudential accounting norms of income recognition, asset classification, provisioning, and capital adequacy were implemented.
Banks were also required to make full provisioning for bulk of
their nonperforming assets. 19 Further, they were permitted to
lend to nontarget group borrowers up to 60 percent of new
loans beginning in 1993–94. Permission was also granted to
introduce new services, such as loans for consumer durables.
In 1994–95, a major recapitalization program was initiated to
strengthen the balance sheets of failing banks. Seventy weak
RRBs were relieved of their service area obligations and permitted
to either relocate their loss-making branches at specified locations,
such as village markets and agricultural produce centers, or to
merge them with other close-by branches. Also, all RRBs were
permitted to invest surplus funds in more profitable avenues,
such as the money market. Further, business plans for achieving
financial viability in five years were formulated in the form of
performance contracts between the RRBs and NABARD.
Finally, in 1997, RBI and NABARD delegated the responsibility
of RRB management to their sponsor banks, although there was
no change in the multiple-ownership structure.
While it was expected that these initiatives would enhance
the efficiency of the financial sector, turn the failing banks
around, and ultimately expand the delivery of financial services
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in rural India, 20 this has not been the case. A number of studies
indicate that while the reforms have introduced an enabling
environment for efficient financial transactions, they have done
little to increase the internal efficiency of the RRBs (Gupta,
1998; Kaladhar, 1997; Reserve Bank of India, 1997). Specifically,
a two-decade administrative culture has stifled creativity and
made the banks’ staff “paper pushers” who became experts at
handling the multiple reporting demands of regulatory bodies.
A key reason for this is that the basic incentive problems facing
the RRB system have not been resolved.

Getting the Incentives Right
For the 70,000 plus RRB employees, then, the new institutional arrangements triggered by the reforms probably impose
yet another set of rules that require compliance. Since attaining
financial viability is their new constraint, it is natural for RRB
managers to take advantage of the new rules of the game and
engage in activities that allow them to maximize performance
with the least risks and costs.
Thus, it is not surprising that RRB managers seem to have
reduced their lending to disadvantaged groups and increased
their money market investments. Doing so is only rational, for
a number of reasons. First, managers understand that without
reduced transaction costs, incentives for repayment, and innovative loan products in place, it is difficult to expect previous
borrowers, who are not accustomed to a culture of loan repayment, to change their behavior and repay new loans on time.
Therefore, lending to old clients is risky. Second, although it is
possible for them to make loans to nontarget group clients
from outside of their “service” areas, most RRB managers find
themselves lacking in credit-appraisal skills. Again, lending
without analyzing the quality of the “credits” is risky.
Third, making new loans requires filling out redundant
forms, screening and monitoring borrowers diligently, and pursuing collections intensively, if one is to be in compliance and
maintain good asset quality. For long-time employees of a
bureaucracy that has never linked remuneration to performance,
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there are no incentives for RRB managers and staff to push
harder, get motivated, and turn their branches around if they do
not get to participate in the fruits of their increased efforts.
Although RRB reforms have led to blanket salary increases,
they have done little to introduce incentives for better performance. Thus, making good loans might be personally costly to
the managers.
Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the
current institutional constraint of financial viability has led
many managers to conclude that “the secret [to branch profitability] is not to lend; or if [one has] to lend, . . . to lend as
little as possible” (Mosley, 1996, p. 257).
What should be done to make such a perverse incentive disappear? One option is to modify the current constraint that
stresses the achievement of only financial sustainability and to
include the volume of credit disbursed as an additional indicator
of performance. Indeed, international experiences in rural
financial intermediation indicate that monitoring progress
toward both outreach and sustainability is critical (Yaron,
1992). This strategy in itself, however, might be ineffective.
Specifically, since the RRB staff are not adept at loan appraisal,
they might once again be tempted to disburse loans without
due diligence to meet quantitative targets. To avoid this
scenario, the provision of appropriate technical and capacitybuilding training will be critical for increasing the competency
of the RRB staff, if this dual-constraint is to be imposed on
them as a measure of performance.
While technical and managerial skills are necessary, they
need to be complemented with many other institutional
changes to enhance program performance. International
experiences indicate that among the many conditions that
facilitate success in rural financial intermediation, the provision of incentives to staff and clients is key (Rhyne & Otero,
1994; Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Yaron, Benjamin & Charitonenko,
1998). In this regard, rewards for officials and clients must be so
designed that the pursuit of what they consider their best interests
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simultaneously contributes to the attainment of the public interest, that is, the maximization of program outreach and sustainability.
Unfortunately, the RRB reform process has not given
enough attention to designing institutional arrangements that
can align the incentives of policy makers with those of banks’
field staff and clients. Neglecting this aspect of reform can be
detrimental to program viability.
The internal efficiency of the RRBs will not likely improve
unless the field staff actively participate in the reform process.
For example, vesting the RRB branch managers with the
authority to make lending decisions and freeing the staff from
redundant and time consuming reporting requirements can not
only boost morale but can also serve as the foundation for
making good loans and operating efficiently. In addition, not
only should RRB branches have group incentives for meeting
and exceeding the outreach and sustainability targets for their
“profit centers,” there also need to be upfront improvements in
the operational infrastructure of the banks. Such actions—
which can include purchase of vehicles for bank branches,
facade improvements for branch buildings, construction of
new storage spaces for files and loan records, and introduction
of new MIS systems to facilitate data storage, retrieval and
manipulation, 21—can serve as signals of credible commitment
on part of the owners (Williamson, 1995) and may go a long
way in turning the RRBs around.
While rural clients will certainly notice the introduction of
new banking “values,” investments in physical improvements
may not be sufficient to change their perceptions regarding the
innate inefficiencies of the RRBs. It may be critical to provide
them with information at village-level forums, regarding the
new and improved business practices of the banks. In addition,
offering them tangible incentives to do business with the RRBs
is highly recommended. Perhaps the most important of these
incentives will be the introduction of new loan products and
financial services that take into consideration local conditions
and unique needs.
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Specifically, a key incentive will be the willingness of RRB
staff to make loans for any purpose, as long as applicants can
demonstrate repayment capacity based on current household
cash flows. 22 Further, it will be critical to communicate a new
culture of enhanced customer service by ensuring convenience
and low transaction costs for clients. Also, incentives such as
intensive collection strategies and interest rebates for prompt
payment will encourage timely loan repayment.
In sum, the key to turning the RRBs around and placing
them on a path of increasing outreach and sustainability is to
devise and implement institutional arrangements that harmonize
“public interest” objectives with the private incentives of bank
staff and clients.

Policy Implications and Conclusions
The lackluster performance of the RRBs during the last two
decades can be largely attributed to their lack of commercial
orientation. Instead of adopting international best practices in
microfinance (Bhatt, Painter, & Tang., 1999; Gonzalez-Vega,
1998; Rhyne & Otero, 1994; Robinson, 1996; Yaron et al.,
1998), specially in terms of reducing transaction costs for
clients (Bhatt, 1997; Bhatt & Tang, 1998b) and lending to individuals based on an appraisal of their ability and willingness to
repay (Bhatt, 1998, 2001), these internally inefficient banks
made loans based on political and social considerations that
defied the very fundamentals of prudent underwriting. Given
their poor portfolio performance over the past decade, the
majority of these banks have been declared as financial disasters as development experts search for alternative ways to
deliver rural financial services.
The unsustainability of the RRBs, has led some observers
to advocate a greater role for nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and self-help groups in rural financial intermediation.
While many such entities seem to have reduced transaction
costs and maintaining low loan losses (Puhazhendhi, 1995;
World Bank, 1997), 23 their outreach is severely limited given
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the size of India’s rural market. Rough estimates suggest that
the total outreach of all the NGOs engaged in rural finance is
not more than 500,000 households (Mira Chatterjee, Senior
Social Development Specialist, World Bank, New Delhi
Regional office, personal communication march 25, 1999).
Given an estimated market potential of over 50 million households, there is little chance that NGOs can meet market
demand. On the other hand, the RRB system and staff, despite
their challenges, have inherent strengths such as an extensive
infrastructure in place for financial services delivery, an understanding of the economics of the local markets within which
they operate, a reputation among many poor households for
being client-friendly, and a comparative advantage in mobilizing
low-cost deposits from sources that commercial banks do not
adequately reach (World Bank, 1998).
It is this context that underscores the urgent need to
reform the RRBs. Although the progress in liberalizing the
policy framework is indeed commendable, the RRBs have a
powerful incentive to minimize lending, under the current
environment of reforms, especially to disadvantaged groups.
In addition to the measures we have already suggested for
aligning the institutional objectives of increasing outreach and
sustainability with the private incentives of bank clients and
staff, a number of policy-level changes are recommended.
First, the majority equity stake, preferably 100 percent
ownership, of the RRBs, needs to be transferred to the sponsor banks to ensure good governance. Having a single owner
is critical for clarifying channels of control, responsibility,
and accountability. However, in keeping with principal-agent
theory, this ownership will be ineffective unless it also gives
sponsor banks free rein to operate the RRBs as real commercial
entities. Second, the process of interest rate liberalization
underway needs to be completed. Since interest rates for commercial banks are still controlled for loan amounts less than
Rs. 200,000, many sponsor banks do not allow RRBs to raise
interest rates for fear of losing business to commercial banks.
86

Volume 3 Number 1

India’s Regional Rural Banks

Third, administrators need to rigorously evaluate claims
regarding dramatic improvements in RRB viability. Since official assessments of loan-recovery performance are based on
estimates of collections over demand, and collections are getting a strong boost from the recovery of portions of overdue
portfolio, it is unclear whether recovery of post-reform loans
is high enough to make the RRBs viable in the long term. In
order to assess accurately the quality of new lending, computation
of a Current Recovery Rate (CRR) that divides total cash receipts
by total amounts falling due for a given loan contract in the postreform period is recommended (Rosenberg, 1999). Given the
challenges faced by RRB accounting systems in segregating
principal from interest, this computation can also allow the
RRBs to produce a reasonable estimate of annual loan losses,
since it does not require segregation of principal from interest
for amounts received or for amounts falling due.
Finally, directed lending to economically weak groups
needs to be completely phased out. Although some observers
might argue that targeted credit is needed to reduce economic
inequities (Velayudham & Sankaranarayanan, 1990), there is a
substantial body of evidence that it is not the poor, but the
better-off households, who benefit from such schemes
(Mathur, 1995; Von Pischke, 1991). Very poor households
often do not have the capacity to handle and repay back debt.
For example, the income generated by IRDP clients is insecure
and risky; borrowing often gets them deeper into debt than
they were to start with. Indeed, for many of the rural poor,
microfinance is not the antipoverty weapon it is often made
out to be (Robinson, 1996). In many circumstances, objectives
to alleviate rural poverty will likely be more effectively furthered
by other types of interventions, such as public health, education,
and employment generation initiatives, and of course infrastructure development programs (Jalan, 1996). These measures
have the additional advantage, as compared to the IRDP, of
enhancing security and reducing risk in poor communities
(Joshi & Little, 1996).
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But while many of our policy prescriptions may be desirable,
is their implementation politically feasible? For example, would
politicians support the elimination of programs that, at least
theoretically, aim to assist the poorest of the poor by placing in
their hands tangible assets such as cash and livestock? Would
politicians back a reform proposal that recommends charging
effective interest rates as high as 25 percent in order to ensure that
programs can cover their costs and become financially viable?
Our answer is a qualified no. Evidence from around the
world suggests that political interests almost always take
precedence over the public interest in reform processes, and
that without political backing, even the most well crafted
reform proposals face ultimate demise. On the other hand,
where political leaders can become allies, reforms can transform failing programs into models of success, as has been the
case for Indonesia’s BRI Unit Desas—money-losing branches of
a state-owned bank that became profitable within two years of
reforms (Robinson, 1998). 24 In the case of India, however, until
such time as leaders feel confident that furthering the public
interest is possible without political suicide (Klitgaard, 1997),
proposals that seem to adversely impact either the agricultural
sector, or socially/economically weak communities, are
unlikely to find support. Thus, educating political leaders and
winning over their support will be critical to implementing the
needed reforms, and ultimately making the RRBs viable.
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Notes
The authors would like to thank Elizabeth Rhyne, Richard Rosenberg, ShuiYan Tang, and Jacob Yaron for their useful comments on earlier drafts of this
article. The usual cavaet applies.
1. Originally established by an ordinance in September 1975, these banks are
governed by the RRB Act which was passed in 1976, and amended in 1987.
2. India is divided into 499 geographic districts.
3. The outreach of the entire formal rural financial system, which includes
the RRBs, the nationalized commercial banks and the credit cooperatives—comprising of primary agricultural credit societies (PACS) and primary/state land
development banks (P/SLDS)—is even more impressive, with one branch per
4,000 rural residents.
4. Average exchange rate (1999): Rupees 43.41 per US$.
5. Loan recovery was calculated as the ratio of collection over demand. Since
loan losses were seldom written off due to inappropriate asset classification and
rescheduling policies, official estimates of may have overstated loan losses.
6. Official accounts often do not adequately provision large uncollectible
portions of the portfolio, and they include accrued interest which may never be
received.
7. For instance, the Investment-Deposit Ratio jumped from 24.5 in 1997–98
to 41.59 in 1998–99.
8. For example, the CD ratio of loans made to deposits collected has
declined, from over 100 percent in 1987 to less than 50 percent in 1997.
9. IRDP was launched nationwide in 1979 to enable households to cross an
income-based poverty line by investing in income-generating activities. The targeting of eligible households was done by local government officials, and the
RRB staff worked with them and the recipient in purchasing an asset bought
with the loan. RRB staff was responsible for the collection of these concessional
loans.
10. The RRB board consisted of two members from the Government of
India, one member from the Reserve Bank of India, one member from
NABARD, two members from the sponsor bank, and two members from the
state government.
11. Often the RRBs and the rural branches of their “sponsor” banks were
geographically proximate, and competed for clients. This further dampened the
RRBs’ relationship with the sponsor banks.
12. The legal upper limits on CRR and SLR stood at 15 percent and 40 percent. For comparison, the reserve requirement is 8 percent or less in most East
Asian countries, and about 2–3 percent in most developed countries.
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13. One Regional Rural Bank was designated as credit supplier to each rural
locality, which was generally confined to 1–2 districts. RRBs having one district as
their area of operation were allowed to open 100 branches, while those operating
in more than one district could open up to 75 branches per district.
14. The prevailing school of thought in policy circles was that loans should generate an income stream from which repayments could be made—a view that ignored
the complex cash flows of poor rural households.
15. When pursuing defaulters with legal action, banks can either proceed with
a civil suit or approach the State Government administration for recovery under
the Agricultural Credit Operations and Miscellaneous Provisions Act.
Proceedings under State acts are quicker as compared to civil suits, which can
drag on for years together.
16. It is interesting to note that “although more than six years have passed since
the closure of the Agricultural & Rural Debt Relief Scheme, banks continue to cite
it as one of the major impediments in the flow of credit and of poor recovery even
in respect of current loans” (Gupta, 1998, p. 25). That many borrowers hope for
future debt-forgiveness confirms North’s (1990) assertion that “changing” an institution (in this case an informal one) that has assumed “deep roots” it is not easy.
17. Mosley assumed that 16.4 percent of the portfolio is written off, which is a
very conservative estimate.
18. According to a World Bank (1998) study of 312 “weak” borrowers in the
state of Tamil Nadu, there were leakages of Rs. 21 for every Rs. 100 of subsidy in
the form of “incidental expenses” and “speed/quick or push money.” About twothirds of the sample also reporting “working” for the subsidy and producing “quick
money” in addition to covering normal expenses.
19. The implementation of prudential accounting norms for 176 RRBs revealed
that only 57.35 percent of their total assets were performing (Reserve Bank of
India, 1997).
20. At the 1997 Microcredit Summit held in Washington, DC, the government
announced that India could have a share of 25 million in the overall target of 100
million poor families to be reached by microfinance worldwide in 2005.
21. This may also facilitate timely identification of defaulting borrowers.
Currently, a branch manager receives a report on “defaulter status” between three
to six months after the loan has become overdue (Gupta, 1998).
22. Mosley’s (1996) field studies of RRB borrowers revealed that loans used for
consumption purposes resulted in higher income gains than those used strictly for
investment. This was because when borrowers took care of their consumption
needs, it helped build their capacity to profitably commit resources to productive
investments in the future.
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23. Indian microfinance NGOs have consistently recorded a loan repayment
performance of over 95 percent.
24. According to Hulme and Mosley (1996, p. 154) “BRI’s unit desas evolved
out of a failed programme under the auspices of Indonesia’s repressive military
regime which has manipulated state institutions to maintain its position. They
have used an element of this authoritarian political framework—the village
head—to help make the programme viable.” Christen (1997) too suggests that
BRI “is dependent on political support for the continuation of its microfinance
program” (p. 20). Of course, in addition to the political backing, the introduction of performance-based incentives for bank staff and clients played a critical
role in turning the unprofitable bank branches around (Charitonenko, Patten, &
Yaron, 1998; Klitgaard, 1994).
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Coordination Failure
in the Rural
Credit Markets
by Atul Mishra
Abstract: This paper tries to explain the curious fact that while at the
national level the rural sector saves more than what it invests in itself
in India, at the micro level, credit constraint is reported to be the
main binding constraint on the activities in the rural economy. The
explanation lies in the phenomenon of coordination failure. The public sector rural banks mobilize huge amounts of savings, but because
of low rates of interest and high default rates, they do not lend in
equal measure. Indeed, in India the public sector rural banks mobilize
as savings three times the amount they lend as credit for investment.
Raising the rate of interest at which the rural banks lend will not
only raise the savings but also the investment in the rural sector. This
is because at the current low level of rate of interest the rural credit
market is severaly rationed. As the rate of interest is allowed to rise
more banks become viable, banks increse their lending, more people
are brought into the ambit of rural banks and away from the money
lender. The poor especially benefit as this increased rate of interest is
still only half the rate of interest that the moneylender charges.The
policy suggestion is to allow the public sector rural banks to charge
economically viable and market clearing rates of interest.

Introduction
An emerging stylized fact about rural credit markets worldwide
is that with the introduction of development financial institutions (DFI), not only do savings go up with an increase in the
rate of interest, so does investment (Mosley and Hulme, 1996,
vol. II; see different chapters for different countries). This paper
attempts to explain this phenomenon. The explanation lies in the
phenomenon of coordination failure in the rural credit markets.
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It is well known that the spread of formal banking in rural
areas has not succeeded in driving out the moneylender from the
rural credit market (Mosley, 1996). Instead, moneylenders continue to thrive—partly because of the special kind of credit needs
they respond to, which the formal sector does not, and partly
because of the transaction cost advantages that a moneylender
has in comparison to those of the formal sector bank (Eswaran
& Kotwal, 1989). Were it the case that the impact of formal sector banking was merely to replace the moneylenders’ business,
there would have been little to recommend it; with the constant
support required in the form of subsidy in the face of mounting
losses, it would have been correctly looked at as a burden on the
rest of the economy. However, to the extent that the rural
banks have done more than merely replace the moneylenders’
business, it hints at the presence of coordination failure possibilities: This is because out of the same total income, there are
two or more levels of savings and investment, and state action
can lift the economy to the higher equilibria. Since most of the
rural banking is under the public sector, we intend to say something on this aspect of the public sector role and performance.
In what follows we first demonstrate the theoretical possibility of coordination failure in the rural credit sector. We
then look at the analytics of such a possibility and derive the
conditions of coordination failure in the rural credit sector.
Finally we consider some innovations in the public sector’s
role in the rural credit sector.

Atun Mishra is a senior lecturer in Shri Ram College of Commerce, University of
Delhi. After a B. A. in Economics from University of Delhi in 1985 and M. A. in
Economics from Jawahar Lal Nehru University, New Delhi in 1987, he has taught in
the Department of Economics at Shri Ram College of Commerce. His Ph.D. thesis, submitted in May 2001 at the University of Reading, UK is titled “The emergence of entrepreneurship in the rural non-farm economy.” The thesis explores the constraints on the
emergence of entrepreneurship and identiﬁes credit constraint as the binding one.
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Rural Credit: Ground Realities
Although different rural areas do differ in the credit institutions
they have, we will work with the following stylized facts about
rural credit:
1. The dominant player in the rural credit market is the rural
bank. It mobilizes more savings from the rural sector than it
disburses in it.
2. Rural banks have not been able to replace the moneylender.
If anything, moneylenders are thriving.
3. Rural banks charge low rates of interest but have high transaction costs.
4. Moneylenders charge high rates of interest but have low
transaction costs.
5. Rural banks have a high default ratio, whereas the moneylenders have a low default ratio.
6. Rural banks lend only for production purposes (though only
a part of lent money ends up as productive), whereas moneylenders lend both for consumption as well as for production
purposes.
The rural banking system in India mobilizes more savings
from the rural sector than it disburses as loans in this sector
(Mosley, 1996). So while the rural banks have to some extent
replaced the moneylender, they have also performed an entirely
new function which the moneylender was not performing—that
is, savings mobilization. In principle this too can leave the situation entirely unchanged if the people who save are also the
people who invest (treating the bank as a safe deposit), but to
the extent that the banks, by mobilizing savings, channel
investible surplus from net savers to net borrowers, they perform a heretofore unperformed activity—and therein lies
another possible source of coordination failure.
However, most rural banks suffer from a very high rate of
default in loan repayment, which has caused most of these banks
to go in the red; sometimes their default rate is so high that their
entire net worth has been wiped off (Mosley, 1996). Yet none of
these banks have been shut down as they continue to mobilize
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impressive amounts of savings. Thus, while on the one hand
they continue to lose sometimes up to 85% of their advances in
defaults, they also continue to mobilize substantial amounts of
savings. This situation would not have been possible without
the state standing behind them to write off all bad debt and continue to subsidize rural credit. If these banks had to depend for
their viability entirely on their deposits and profitable advances,
most of them would have long since gone under—or else they
would have had to take on some of the features of the more successful rural banks, that is, higher rate of interest, higher administration expenditure on collection, higher incentive for
repayment, etc. That they continue to exist with continuous
loss-making subsidized credit advances opens up another possibility of coordination failure

What Is a Coordination Failure?
Coordination failures are situations in which agents fail to
coordinate their decisions to arrive at a mutually beneficial
state of affairs. This failure to coordinate occurs because
under the current state of affairs, no individual agent has the
incentive to make a decision that would bring all of them to
a better state of affairs. On the other hand, if all of them
made the decision simultaneously, a better state of affairs
would result. Thus in a given situation, “while the rate of
return to coordinated investment may be extremely high, the
rate of return to individual investment may be low” (Rodrik,
1995, p. 78). At a given level of capital stock it may not be
meaningful to talk about marginal productivity of capital,
since the marginal productivity of capital at a certain level of
stock now has a range of values that depends on the level of
coordination in the rest of the economy. Instead of working
with a continuum of coordination possibilities, we will think
of a discrete number of coordination possibilities.
The classic case of coordination failure was that of demand
externality. Underdeveloped countries are underdeveloped
because of small markets for goods, so no single sector can
98

Volume 3 Number 1

Coordination Failure in the Rural Credit Markets

expand their output. However, if all sectors expanded output
simultaneously, they would create demand for each other and
thus make viable the higher level of output in all sectors. The fact
that the economy could simultaneously sustain more than one
equilibria, that they could be ranked, and that when the economy is trapped in the low equilibrium, no agent independently
has the incentive to move to the higher equilibrium, whereas a
coordinated movement would lift the economy to the higher
equilibria—all characterize the existence of coordination failure.

Discussion
The low rates of interest charged by rural banks results in
excess demand, and because the rates of interest are fixed, into
rationing (Braverman & Guasch, 1989). Since only relatively
rich people can provide the collateral, the poor are rationed
out. People whose loan demand is not satisfied then turn to the
moneylender, whose rate of interest further rises in response to
this excess demand.
Thus we have two rates of interest in the rural sector: r
charged by the bank, and R charged by the moneylender (R is
greater than r). This means that there is a whole range of economic opportunities which promise an expected rate of return
between r and R and which are not undertaken for lack of funds.
The rural bank suffers from three problems in its lending
activity: it may choose wrong projects to fund because of
inadequate information (adverse selection), its employees may
cheat the bank by deliberately choosing wrong projects
(moral hazard) for private gain, or employees may not have
enough incentive to enforce repayment.
It is important to realize that the fact that the rural bank
has a high default rate is not just a matter of public sector
inefficiency. A private sector monopoly would also suffer
from similar defaults even if it covered costs by charging
higher interest. So merely allowing the rural bank to charge a
higher rate of interest may allow it to cover costs, but it will
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leave the essential problem of information asymmetry unaddressed and thus leave the inefficiency aspects unresolved.
Hypothesis: We claim that the fact that rural banks mobilize
an amount of savings that is more than what it disburses, combined
with the general shortage of credit availability (as seen when private moneylenders not only charge a higher rate of interest but also
have a low level of default), suggests the presence of coordination
failure. Suitable policy design can lead to a higher share of rural
savings going to rural investment.
It must be pointed out that this coordination failure is not
policy-induced. In the absence of government intervention, the
equilibrium is unique to low savings and low investment.

Analysis
In Figures 1 and 2 we show the time profile of the formal and
informal sector credit availability. We see that what is true at
one point of time is not true over a period of time. Consider
first Figure 1. Here the interest rate in the formal sector is set
at less than the break-even rate; i.e., the formal sector banking
is subsidized. While it may be advantageous to the rural sector
in the short run, we see that the loan availability itself goes
down over the long run because the system is not generating
surplus. And as the formal sector loan availability goes down,
the availability goes up in the informal sector because of the
surplus generated in the sector. On the other hand, in Figure 2
the formal sector interest rate is set at or above the break-even
rate. Here we see that in the short run, while the rural sector
has to bear a higher rate of interest, in the long run this makes
for a higher loan availability in the rural sector. Thus subsidy,
if not supported from the outside, does not automatically benefit the target group. In the current scenario of economic
reforms and fiscal austerity, where all sorts of subsidies are
being pruned (in the annual budget of the Government of India
in 1997–98, the subsidy was sought to be brought down by
half), it is important to recognize these facts.
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In Figure 3a and Figure 3b we show the same phenomenon
in terms of its impact not on the volume of loan availability
but on the rate of interest. Consider first Figure 3a. The formal
sector supply curve is perfectly elastic at the rate of interest r o ,
which is less than the break-even rate and also the market
clearing equilibrium rate. The corresponding situation in the
informal sector (Figure 3b) shows a comparatively inelastic
supply curve intersecting the demand curve at a higher rate of
interest. In Figure 4a we begin in the formal sector with the
surplus generating rate of interest r 3 . This, over time, shifts the
supply curve to the right, and the market clearing rate of interest keeps on falling. The corresponding story in the informal
sector (Figure 4b) is that as loan availability increases in the
formal sector, fewer and fewer people are required to resort to
the informal sector, so that the demand curve keeps on shifting
leftwards and downwards because of which the rate of interest
in the informal sector keeps on falling. In Figures 5a, 5b, and
5c we bring the insights of the above two to generate the possibility of coordination failure.
In Figure 5a the backward bending curve shows that the
investment in the formal sector first increases with the rate of
interest and then declines. This is because as the formal sector
rate of interest rises, loan availability increases; and as the
shorter side of the market rules in disequilibrium (i.e., the formal sector has excess demand at the going rate of interest) total
investment made out of borrowings from the formal sector
increases. But this happens only up to a point, after which the
higher rate of interest compares poorly with the expected rate
of return and the investment demand goes down. Figure 5b has
the same investment curve as in Figure 5a but it has a savings
curve imposed on it. The savings curve completely overlaps the
investment curve up to the point at which the investment
curve starts bending backwards. This is because up to this
point, the savings-investment market was in disequilibrium,
and the law of the shorter side ruling meant that equality
would hold.
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But after a point, while savings continue to rise with the
rate of interest, investment does not. Finally in Figure 5c we
show that in a situation in which both the investment and savings curves are upward sloping, this could generate multiple
equilibria and thus possibilities of coordination failure. In the
next section we see what policy measures this might call for.

Let us now introduce another source of coordination failure, that of moral hazard originating in imperfect information.
In the rural credit market the nature of coordination failure
is as follows: From the same total amount of savings mobilized,
two different levels of economic activity become feasible: one in
which most of the loan is dispersed by the formal sector, which
has very poor access to information and thus works with poor
screening, monitoring, and enforcement, and most of the loan
(as much as 85%) ends up in bad debt; and another, in which
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most of the loan is routed through private agents with excellent
local information, who charge higher rates of interest to procure
this information, and the level of default is low. (Indeed, this
fact has recently been recognized in a policy paper of the
Reserve Bank of India, which has asked the rural banks to give
loans to self-help groups.) The fact that from the same level of
aggregate rural savings we can generate two different levels of
entrepreneurship suggests the presence of coordination failure
possibilities. The basis of this coordination failure is in the
imperfect-information nature of rural credit market—procuring
information and transacting in small amounts is costly, and
higher rates of interest are required to cover this cost.
Thus if from the same level of aggregate savings we can generate two different equilibria of rate of interest, we would have
demonstrated another example of coordination failure. Consider now Figure 6, which shows comparison of capabilities in
savings mobilization and productive investment between the
public sector rural bank and the moneylender (in this generic
term we include other private agents, such as traders, etc.).

I S
Moneylender Rural Bank

Rural Bank

Moneylender

I

II

High Savings

Poor Savings

Poor Quality
Investment

Poor Quality
Investment

III

IV

High Savings

Poor Savings

High Quality
Investment

High Quality
Investment

Figure 6. A comparison of saving and investment
capabilities of banks and moneylenders. While banks
are good in saving mobilization, the moneylenders
are not. The opposite is true in investment.
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Box I shows a situation in which both the savings mobilization as well as investment decision are made by the rural
bank. We claim that this will result in high savings but poor
quality of investment, for the above-mentioned reasons. Box II
shows savings mobilization through the moneylender and
investment decision by the bank. This is the worst-case scenario, in which both the activities are performed at the low
level. This is because moneylenders are poor mobilizers of savings, and banks are poor at determining the productivity of
loans. Box III is the best of all possible worlds: where banks
mobilize savings and lend them for investment through some
private route, such as agents. (This system is already in use in
Indonesia. There, moneylenders have been co-opted into the
microfinance program. Thus banks give loans to moneylenders, who pass them on to the end users. The moneylenders
charge a higher rate of interest than what they pay to the bank,
but they also absorb all risk of default (see Mosley & Hulme,
1996, vol. I, p. 74 ). Finally, in Box IV, moneylenders mobilize
savings as well as decide on investment; this gives a low rate of
savings mobilization and a high productivity of investment.
The Indian rural credit market exists in part in Box I and in
part in Box IV. The desired change is in the direction of Box
III: already some distance has been travelled in that direction as
the banks have started giving loans to self-help groups, with
joint liability for repayment and excellent results. Reserve
Bank of India estimates that the repayment rate among these
self-help groups is close to 100%.

Empirical Evidence
The evidence of the claim that at higher rates of interest, both
savings and investments go up comes from diverse countries. In
almost all countries, with the coming into prominence of
microfinance institutions, the rate of interest charged on loans
by the nonmoneylender agencies has gone up, and so has the
level of savings and investment.
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At a theoretical level, evidence that with the arrival of MFIs,
both savings and investment go up at a higher rate of interest is
trivial. Since these institutions are surviving, are mobilizing savings, and are giving credit, they are increasing the volume of
investment taking place in the rural sector. However, both with
regard to net investment and with regard to average rate of
interest (which takes into account the change in the rate of
interest of the moneylenders, with the arrival of the MFIs),
one has to take into account what is happening in other parts
of the rural financial sector. As for net investment, the productive investment component of MFI’s credit does not substitute for the moneylender’s loan, since moneylenders’ loans are
mostly for consumption purposes. Can we still claim that with
the arrival of MFIs the average rate of interest has gone up?
Though there is evidence to the contrary (the moneylenders
reduce their rate of interest with the coming of the MFIs; see
Mosley & Hulme, 1996, vol.II, p. 23), we compare that rate of
interest which is relevant to productive investment. Here, the
only relevant rate of interest to compare with is the bank rate
of interest, since banks are the only alternative source of
finance for investment expenditures in the rural sector. Since
rural banks have not lowered the rate of interest at which they
lend, the average rate of interest for loans for investment purposes has unambiguously gone up.
Since 1983 the Indonesian government has allowed,
and Indonesian financial institutions have taken advantage of, freedom to set their own interest rates. . . . In
the BKK and the KURK systems there are a variety of
loan models, . . . and the nominal monthly interest
rates from 2 percent to 4.8 percent. . . . The effective
rates resulting from the variegated menu offered by the
BKKs and KURKs range from 26 percent to 130
percent. . . . All the institutions studied here have
charged highly positive rates of interest. (Mosley &
Hulme, 1996, vol. II, p. 41)

Volume 3 Number 1

109

Journal of Microfinance

In Indonesia, “real interest rates on normal savings deposits
increased from 5.26% in 1982 to 10.7% in 1985, and nationally
savings deposits more than tripled over those same three years
“(Mosley & Hulme, 1996, vol. II, p. 34).
“The BRI voluntary savings schemes have succeeded
beyond all expectations, and as of December 1993 they have
just over 7 million savers and have accumulated Rp. 957 billion
in client savings” (Mosley & Hulme, 1996, vol. II, p. 43).
During the same period, loans for investment increased
from an average of $199 in 1986 to $625 in 1992 (Mosley &
Hulme, 1996, vol. II, p. 48).
In the case of PRODEM/BancoSol, the number of new borrowers increased from 1737 in 1987 to 15,300 in 1994, just as
the average loan size increased from $92 to $361 (Mosley &
Hulme, 1996, vol. II, p. 7) The amount disbursed increased
from $462,000 in 1987 to $24.7 million in 1993. During the
same period, the value of savings increased from zero in 1987 to
over $3 million in 1994. All this took place at an annual rate of
interest of 60% per year (Mosley & Hulme, 1996, vol. II, p. 5).
In Sri Lanka, with the formation of thrift and credit
cooperatives, total deposits increased from $5.5 million in
1981 to $13.5 million in 1992, just as total loans disbursed
increased from $3.3 million in 1981 to $5.5 million in 1992.
SANASA’s savings mobilized went up from Rs. 418 million in
1989 to Rs. 696.8 million in 1992, whereas its advances went
up from Rs. 416 million in 1989 to Rs. 715 million in 1992
(Mosley and Hulme, 1996, vol. II, p. 228). During the same
period, SANASA’s (1992) rate of interest ranged between 20%
and 80% per year.

Policy
The solution to the problem of credit constraints in rural activities lies not in greater resource mobilization but in innovation
in institutional design, since the problem lies in the delivery of
credit rather than in the size of aggregate savings. We have
already identified the institution as the self-help group, an
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association of poor people who save and borrow collectively;
peer monitoring ensures a high rate of repayment of loan. In
Figure 7 as we replace money lenders with self help groups, we
move to Box III where savings are mobilized by the bank but
the investment decision is made by the self help group. This
results both in high savings and high quality investment.

Self-help Group

Rural Bank

I S

Rural Bank
I

Self-help Group
II

High Savings

High Savings

Poor Quality
Investment

Poor Quality
Investment

III

IV

High Savings

High Savings

High Quality
Investment

High Quality
Investment

Figure 7. Policy innovation replaces moneylender
with self-help groups. This is a Pareto improvement
over the earlier situation since we now have both
high savings and more productive investment.

What is clear at the outset is that withdrawal from rural
banking because of losses incurred is undesirable. This is
because even if there were no defaults, the break-even rate of
interest would still have to be twice the rate currently charged.
Thus the losses were, so to speak, planned losses. Indeed, the
coordination failure possibilities in the rural credit market arise
precisely because of the existence of public-sector rural banking. If there were no public-sector rural banks (PSRB), and the
field were left entirely to moneylenders, there would be no
coordination failure: this is because in the absence of a financial
intermediary (no private-sector bank wishes to open branches
in the rural sector, as is evidenced by records before bank
nationalization), savings would not be mobilized from the public (the moneylenders do not have the authority to mobilize
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savings, and in any case they lack credibility), and we are locked
into the low equilibrium, where the moneylender lends from
his own savings. The amount lent and borrowed would be very
small and at a very high rate of interest. This would be a unique
equilibrium, and the economy would be trapped in it, since
there would be nowhere else to go. However, with the presence
of the public sector rural banks (PSRB), the whole situation
changes. This is precisely because of the ability of the public
sector banks to mobilize savings. Even loss-making public sector banks thus open possibilities of multiple equilibria. The aim
of rural banking should be to maximize this saving mobilization
and channel it to the most productive investment in the rural
sector over the long run. This means that the rate of interest
chosen should be the surplus-generating rate of interest, and
in the limiting case, even the market-clearing equilibrium rate
of interest. However, the rate of interest is not the only instrument available with the bank. The other instruments are
• Increased expenditure on loan collection
• Increased incentive on loan repayment
• Increased disincentive on default, in the form of lending to
groups that have peer monitoring
All these will lead to the attainments of the higher equilibrium and provide for a higher rate of investment in the
rural sector.
What is the coordination task of the state? The task
required is precisely to mobilize the savings and channel it to
productive investment. This leads the economy to a higherlevel equilibrium, compared to the situation in which the state
does not intervene. This intervention need not generate loss.
Note, however, that even if the system generates loss, so long as
it generates an amount of savings from the rural sector that is
greater than what it lends to the rural sector, it may even be
worthwhile to maintain the loss-making banking system: this
would depend on how the loss generated on the mobilization of
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the marginal rupee of savings compares with the productivity
of the marginal rupee in the rural or urban sector.

Conclusion
We have seen that the presence of subsidized credit by the public sector banks in the rural credit market creates a possibility
of multiple equilibria with respect to the rate of interest. This
means that when the public-sector rural banks charge low rate
of interest on their loans, they create conditions of excess
demand and thus of rationing. Charging a market-clearing (as
well as surplus-generating) rate of interest results in a rise in
both the savings and the investment levels in the rural sector,
as evidenced by numerous examples. Further, the higher rate
of interest charged by the public sector rural bank is still much
lower than what the moneylenders would charge the rationed
out loanees in the rural sector.

Notes
Numerous studies (e.g., Mosley, P. & Hulme, D. (1996) ibid. Vol II Tables
12.13 and 13.7 ) show that the economically viable rate of interest in the Indian
public-sector rural banks is between 24% and 36% per annum. While this is more
than double the current rate of interest at 14% per annum, it is considerably less
than 5% per month that the moneylenders usually charge. At a simple rate of
interest, it turns out to be 60% per year.
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How To Reduce
Arrears In
Microﬁnance
Institutions
by Dan Norell
Abstract: Reducing arrears is crucial if MFIs are to achieve selfsufficiency. MFI staff must understand the causes of arrears—whether
from clients’ testing the MFI’s determination to collect, crises in
clients’ lives, loans that are too large, or loans given on the basis of
favoritism. Analytical tools for assessing and preventing arrears
include key measures for analyzing arrears (e.g., portfolio quality
ratios and performance ratios by credit officer) and financial ratio tests
for determining appropriate loan size. The key to reducing arrears is
to follow up late loans quickly, form strong solidarity groups, update
and enforce credit policies, focus credit officers’ services in a specific
geographic scope, not lend to start-up businesses, and provide financial
incentives for credit officers. In critical arrears situations, MFIs should
suspend lending to new clients until portfolio quality improves, as
well as ascertain clients’ ability and willingness to repay in order to
design appropriate strategies to pursue.

Introduction
A key to achieving scale and operational and financial selfsufficiency is to reduce the percentage of loans in arrears. To
maintain good portfolio quality, microfinance professionals
must understand (1) what causes arrears and (2) how arrears
can be reduced. This paper addresses these two elements.

Journal of Microfinance

Causes of Arrears
Delinquent loans are loans that have been written off by a
microfinance institution (MFI). Arrears are defined as late
loans, and they can increase in MFIs for several reasons.
Common reasons are explained below.
• Microentrepreneurs often test the MFI to see if it is serious
about collecting loan payments. They may know the MFI is
a nonprofit organization funded by overseas donors, mean
ing that MFI staff are not responsible to shareholders to
make a profit.
• Clients’ lives are often full of unpredictable crises, such as ill
ness or death in the family. They are called on to provide for
the extended family and are seen as disloyal to them if they
refuse. They feel compelled to provide financial help, even if
the funds are borrowed from the MFI.
• If loans are too large for the cash needs of the business, extra
funds may go toward personal use. When the loan needs to be
repaid, the client cannot pay back the loan without decapi
talizing the business. In other words, the client has to use the
net equity of the business to pay back the loan. World
Vision’s Georgia Credit Fund cites the use of the loan for
personal uses as a key factor in the success or failure of a loan.
• If loans are given on the basis of favoritism, clients may
attempt to delay payment or default. They often hope that
their friend on the MFI staff will encourage the organization
to write off the loan rather than take the clients to court or
seize their property. This can be a problem with small busi
ness loans. Often, the larger the loan size, the greater the
incentive for friends of credit officers to receive these loans.

Dan Norell is Team Leader of the Development Resources Team for the U.S. ofﬁce of
World Vision. In the microﬁnance sector, he provides technical assistance and training
to MFIs, provides input on the development of microﬁnance guidelines and standards,
represents World Vision in professional associations, and assists in fundraising with
public and private donors.
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Analytical Tools for Assessing
and Preventing Arrears
Key Measures for Analyzing Arrears
To reduce arrears, an aging analysis should be done monthly,
because it is the only way for management and the board of
directors to know the portfolio’s health. If done regularly, a
problem’s seriousness can be reinforced with each report and
discussed by management and the board. Key measures for ana
lyzing the arrears situation are described below.
Portfolio at Risk (over one day late). The ratio of risk equals
the value of outstanding balance of loans over one day late
divided by the value of loans outstanding. The Portfolio at
Risk (over one day late) ratio is an early warning device, indi
cating a lack of financial discipline in the system. An accoun
tant from a World Vision–affiliated MFI did not register
partial payments as late, wanting to keep the ratio looking
good and not penalize clients who were making an effort to
repay. When the MFI installed a computerized loan-tracking
system, it was not as charitable as the accountant. Partial pay
ments were registered as late, incurred a late-payment charge,
and were put in the Portfolio at Risk (over one day) statistics.
This showed management that clients were not paying because
they were not held accountable, and this contributed to a
major arrears problem.
In some ways, loans that are one to thirty days late can be
compared to the common cold. Although it’s not a serious
problem initially, it can worsen into pneumonia. Quick action
by MFI credit officers and management is needed. Because
clients often know one another, late payments can become
infectious and spread into widespread delinquency. The indus
try standard for Portfolio at Risk (over one day late) is below
10 percent.
Portfolio at Risk (over thirty days late). This ratio equals the
value of outstanding balances of loans late more than thirty
days divided by the value of loans outstanding. It is the key
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arrears measure because it means the borrower has awakened
thirty mornings and chosen not to repay the MFI, so the prob
ability of nonpayment continuing is high. The credit officer
and MFI must take some action or stand losing the entire loan.
Hence the name Portfolio at Risk. According to one writer
(Rosenberg, 1999, p. 14) for the Consultative Group for the
Poorest (CGAP):
This measure discriminates between loans where a pay
ment is just barely late and much riskier loans that
have been overdue a long time. It distinguishes a late
payment that represents the last installment of a 24month loan from one that represents the first. It gives
proper relative weight to small and large loans, shortand long-term loans. Managers who receive a daily or
weekly aged Portfolio at Risk (PAR) report can
quickly pick out loans that need to be pursued aggres
sively, while keeping a finger on the pulse of overall
portfolio quality. No one indicator meets all needs or
all situations, but an aged PAR is generally the single
most useful indicator. Almost all MFIs should produce
and use such a report.
The industry standard for the Portfolio at Risk (over thirty
days late) is less than 5 percent. At a higher rate, the MFI risks
losing the entire loan balance.
Principal Payments in Arrears (over one day late). This ratio
is calculated by dividing the value of principal payments in
arrears by the value of loans outstanding, very similar to the
Portfolio at Risk (over one day late). The only difference is
that the numerator has the value of principal payments in
arrears rather than the value of outstanding balances of loans
in arrears. Many practitioners prefer the Portfolio at Risk to
the Principal Payments in Arrears because it measures the
entire amount the MFI stands to lose, not just missed principal
payments. The World Vision U.S. standard for this measure
ment is 8 percent. Because the value of late principal payments
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is divided against the entire value of loans outstanding, the
measure needs to be lower than the Portfolio at Risk (over one
day late) measurement. The Portfolio at Risk (over one day
late) measurement is calculated by using the entire value of the
outstanding balances of loans in arrears.
Principal Payments in Arrears (over thirty days late). This
ratio equals the value of payments in arrears (over thirty days
late) divided by the value of loans outstanding. There is no
clear industry standard for this measurement, but World
Vision U.S. uses a standard of less than 4 percent.
Repayment Rate. This ratio is calculated as the amount paid
(minus any prepayments) divided by the sum of the amounts
due plus the amounts past due.This ratio has fallen out of favor
among microfinance practitioners because it hides a looming
arrears problem. Often prepayments are not subtracted, so the
good works of prepayers cover up late payments of those in
arrears. The industry standard is 95 percent.
Financial Ratios by Credit Officer. While it is helpful to
management to know the health of the MFI’s loan portfolio,
the credit officers and their supervisor should list each finan
cial ratio by credit officer. The credit officer and supervisor
can then take steps to reduce each credit officer’s arrears rate.

Tests for Determining Appropriate Loan Size
It is critical that the loan size be appropriate for the size of the
business. This paper argues that MFIs should ascertain the
repayment capacity of clients’ businesses by collecting data on
sales and assets. It could be maintained that loans should be
given solely on the basis of character, since microcredit is often
called “character-based lending,” but loans create debt for the
client. A Mennonite Economic Development Associates
(MEDA) program once gave a loan for a chicken business to a
pastor—a man of impeccable character. However, because the
pastor was not a good financial manager, he was saddled with
a very large debt that he could not repay.
MFI staff can use financial ratios to determine appropriate
loan size. Several of these financial ratios will be discussed.
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However, not all the financial ratios discussed are required to
determine the loan size, especially for solidarity groups. The
first two (Debt-Equity Ratio and Repayment Capacity) are the
most important for solidarity group and community banking
loans. These ratios require that the community bank or loan
officer collect sales, assets, and liabilities information from
each client. This information is important to collect because if
the MFI is lowering sales or decreasing a client’s net worth,
then the loan may be harming rather than helping the client.
Debt-Equity Ratio. This ratio is the key determinant of the
loan size a client should receive. The Debt-Equity Ratio equals
the sum of existing liabilities and the loan amount divided by
the net equity, where net equity equals assets minus liabilities.
MEDA usually has 0.50 as the maximum debt-equity ratio
allowable for a loan. This means that if the business has a net
equity after liabilities of $1,000, the maximum size loan with
no other existing liabilities is (0.50)($1,000), or $500. In special
cases, the debt-equity ratio may exceed 0.50, but it should never
be more than 0.75. These special cases include the following:
• The business has net equity that is less than $500.
• The client wants to purchase a fixed asset at a fixed price.
• The client has a contract for the goods to be produced.
• The client has customer advances that inflate the debt owed.
• The client has an excellent repayment history.
It is very easy to give a loan that is too large. Care should
be exercised so that the client and the MFI are not exposed to
too much risk. Some credit officers may argue that clients have
too few assets to be included as equity. One credit officer in
the World Vision Azerbaijan Microfinance Program, who lent
to Internally Displaced Persons, challenged the ratio. He felt
that the sales and profit potential for selling goods such as
leather jackets was greater than reflected in the debt-equity
ratio. While this assertion may be correct, the risk for the MFI
increases with increases in the leverage of the debt to equity.
Repayment Capacity. This ratio is second most important in
determining loan size. It compares the client’s average monthly
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payment (principal and interest) to the business’s current
monthly sales. The average payment should not exceed 8 percent of monthly sales.
The repayment capacity ratio equals the average monthly
payment, divided by current monthly sales. Use of this ratio
prevents overburdening the client with difficult payments. The
MFI should use the current monthly sales figure and avoid
overly optimistic growth projections. One Georgian Credit
Fund credit officer felt that an 8 percent limit was too liberal
because profits in Eastern Europe ran at about 7–11 percent of
sales. If 8 percent of sales were used to repay the MFI, the
entrepreneurs would not have any additional profits left to
reinvest in the business; instead, they would just be working
for the MFI with no benefit to their business or families. With
the individual lending program, the Georgia Credit Fund sets a
maximum of 15 percent of profits to be used for principal and
interest, so it intends to set the initial repayment capacity ratio
at a maximum of 2 percent of sales.
Loan Collateral. Loans may be secured by individual guar
antors or, in the case of groups, other group members. In the
past, the MEDA program in Nicaragua, CHISPA, required
that each member of the solidarity group pledge collateral to
the group. In case of individual defaulting, other group mem
bers can pay the individual’s part of the late principal, interest,
and penalty payments and take the property that was pledged
in collateral. These pledges are written down and signed; the
group leader and the MFI each keep one copy. (Currently,
CHISPA has been converted to a registered bank whose focus
is individual lending rather than solidarity group lending.) The
loan collateral ratio equals the estimated value of collateral
divided by the loan amount.
Some organizations believe that the collateral pledged
should be at least twice the loan amount. For example, $400
must be pledged to qualify for a loan of $200. Other MFIs only
require 100 percent or 125 percent. The more collateral that is
pledged, the lower the risk to the MFI. World Vision generally
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requires 100 percent of the loan in collateral and recommends
a loan collateral ratio of 2.
Increase in Owners’ Equity. Another evaluation measure is
the increase in net owners’ equity during the last loan cycle
compared to the increase in loan size. This may seem logical,
given the .50 limit to the debt-equity ratio, but it bears repeat
ing. It is easy to allow the loan size to get too big, especially on
repeat loans. If the MFI requires the net owners’ equity to
grow proportionally to the loan increase, the debt equity ratio
should not change. For example, if in the first loan the debtequity ratio of existing liabilities of $500 plus the loan amount
$500 divided by the net equity of $2000 equals .50, then a sec
ond loan of $600 should be balanced with at least $2,200 in net
equity—a $200 increase—so that the debt-equity ratio remains
the same: the existing liabilities of $500 plus the loan amount
$600 divided by the net equity of $2,200 still equals .50.
Character and Integrity. Character and integrity tests are as
important as financial tests, since microfinance is often called
character-based lending. In Zimbabwe, Dunn & Bradstreet lists
individuals who have been taken to court for bad debts. With
group lending, each group member should be well known to
each other group member, for each signs individually to guaran
tee the entire group’s loan. With individual lending, guarantors
often guarantee the loan, and they should vouch for the charac
ter of the client. They need to know that if clients do not repay
their loans, the MFI will take the guarantor to court to collect
on the loan.

Reducing Arrears
Preventing or Reducing Arrears
MFIs can take a number of actions to reduce arrears. To begin
with, quick follow-up visits right after a missed payment are
key to reducing arrears. One credit officer in a MEDA-affiliated
MFI in Nicaragua has an almost zero percent arrears rate. He
checks each day before the close of business for his clients
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who did not pay that day. After office hours or early the next
day, he visits the client to inquire about the missed payment.
If the late client is visited the first day after the repayment is
missed, the credit officer comes as a friend and can warn of the
consequences of late payment, including legal action the MFI
takes as a matter of policy. However, a credit officer who
comes a week or more later may be perceived as a police offi
cer for the MFI. The credit officer should clearly communicate
that the MFI will take action, but should not overplay his or
her hand and upset the client. The client could then say, “Fine,
I will see you in court. Until then, I will not cooperate at all.”
For group loans, regular visits to the home and business of
the chairperson are important. One main reason MFIs use
group-lending methods is to lower transaction costs. If the
follow-up for late group loans is done on an individual basis for
individual businesses, the cost savings are lost. Unfortunately, it
is often the chairperson or another leader who has misused the
money. To reduce the risk of this, the roles and responsibilities
of the chair and other leaders need to be clear in the training
and home visits. The chairs need to know that the first stop in
case of arrears will be their house or business. Any MFI-initiated
court action will target the assets of the chairperson first.
The formation of strong solidarity groups is also key to
preventing high arrears. The training and formation stage
often covers several sessions. Group members must clearly
understand their roles and responsibilities and fully grasp that
they are individually signing for the loans of each group mem
ber. MEDA’s affiliate in Nicaragua states several key group
principles in its Solidarity Group Credit Policies and
Procedures (1997):
• Groups of four to six individuals (preferably five) select each
other based on trust and knowledge of each other’s business
and character. They operate their businesses and preferably
live in the same area. Ideally, their businesses are the same
size and have the same credit needs and debt capacity.
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• Each group uses the loan for the purpose specified in the
loan application.
• Each member of the group participates in all training activities.
• Each group selects a group leader who is responsible to col
lect and submit payments each week, liaison with the credit
officer, and initiate and maintain group peer pressure.
• Each group member agrees to guarantee the loans of others
in the group. If one member fails to pay, other group mem
bers are responsible to make the payment.
• Senior management should regularly review lending policies
and procedures. The credit supervisor should check with
credit officers daily to ensure that policies are followed. It
makes no sense to have strong policies on paper that are not
followed in the field.
Next, if credit officers have a specific geographic region,
they can visit clients more often; limiting geographic scope
reduces time and money wasted traveling from the office to
clients’ businesses. More visits enable credit officers to develop
relationships in their neighborhoods.
Another benefit of assigning credit officers specific geo
graphic regions is that the impact of increasing clients’ incomes
can, in turn, have an impact on the neighborhood. If many
clients live in one neighborhood, visible signs of development
can be seen: greater economic activity; more interest in
schools, churches, and community institutions; and higher lev
els of school attendance by children of microentrepreneurs.
On the other hand, if the MFI’s benefits are spread over an
entire metropolitan area, the multiplier effect of higher
incomes will be diluted. World Vision has found this synergis
tic effect in other programming. As a consequence, World
Vision programming now focuses on specific areas called Area
Development Programs (ADPs), which may include credit, sav
ings, health, well-drilling, education, and other services. 1
Another strategy for reducing arrears is to loan only to
microentrepreneurs who have been in business at least twelve
months. Businesses are most likely to fail within the first year
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of operation. If they have existed for at least twelve months on
the owner’s money, the infusion of money from the MFI
should be a lower risk than if the business is a start-up. Some
MFIs use six months as a minimum, others three. The lower
the number of months, the higher the risk for the MFI. This
measure cannot always be applied, e.g., when working with
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs, persons displaced by civil
conflict), who will not usually have an existing business.
Since many of these businesses are start-ups, it pays to be
conservative in loan size. Some Georgia Credit Fund credit
officers maintain that in a transitional economy like the
Republic of Georgia, year-old businesses were more likely to
fail than those that were three months old because they were
more likely to face significant changes in the economic envi
ronment. For example, small bakeries were struggling because
the government allowed only large bakeries to sell on the
street. A new entrepreneur would not open a bakery because of
new competition from large bakeries, but an entrepreneur who
opened such a bakery one year ago would be stuck trying to
make the best of a difficult situation. A new business may be
less likely to fail than an older one in a dynamic economy.
Yet another way to reduce arrears is to require the credit
officer to visit the client and the client to receive training prior
to the transaction of each loan. It is easy for MFIs to assume
that a client or group should get larger loans after each loan
cycle, assuming that clients will repay new loans on time if
they have repaid past loans on time. However, it is often on the
second and third loans that clients fall behind, perhaps because
the loan size has grown too big or because the client has begun
to take the MFI for granted. The MFI should apply the same
rigorous financial and character tests to both new and repeat
loans. Only by treating each loan as new can the loan sizes be
calibrated each time, on the basis of actual financial data.
Finally, financial incentives can be used to lower the arrears
rates for individual credit officers. One MEDA partner in

Volume 3 Number 1

125

Journal of Microfinance

Zimbabwe, Phakama (Arise) Economic Development Company,
developed the following incentives for credit officers:
• 5% of salary if 95% of target portfolio is maintained in the
month.
• 10% of salary if the arrears rate is not more than 10%.
• 20% of salary if the arrears rate is not more than 5%.
• 30% of salary if the arrears rate is not more than 2%.
Katherine Stearns writes about credit officer incentive
plans in The Hidden Beast: Delinquency in Microenterprise
Credit Programs (p. 51):
Another strategy that has proven quite effective in
finding solutions is to design an incentive system for
the loan officers that includes on-time payments as an
important variable. If well designed, the system can
motivate advisers to look for and eliminate the causes
of arrears, as well as to meet other program objectives.
An evaluation of the ADEMI program in the
Dominican Republic concluded that one of the most
important factors contributing to the decrease in
arrears (payments past due more than 1 day/portfolio)
from 25 percent in 1986 to 10 percent in 1988 was the
incentive system implemented for the advisers in
which they receive monthly bonuses depending upon
the performance of their portfolios.
The above measures are important for preventing or reduc
ing arrears. Sometimes an arrears problem is so serious, however,
that the MFI’s management needs to take more drastic action.

Reducing Arrears in a Critical Situation
If the arrears rate has risen to such an extent that it threatens
the life of the MFI, management must take serious measures.
Several that MFIs have used are described below.
Suspending lending to new clients until the Portfolio at
Risk (over one day) ratio falls to below 10 percent would send
a clear message that arrears are taken seriously by the MFI’s
management and the board of directors. In school, a student
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may not advance to the next grade until mastering a certain
level. Likewise, an MFI should not be allowed to access more
lending capital until a certain level of proficiency is achieved.
It is suggested that a Portfolio at Risk (over one day) ratio of
less than 10 percent, a Portfolio at Risk (over thirty days) ratio
of less than 5 percent, and a Principal Payments in Arrears
(over one day) ratio of less than 8 percent serve as such mini
mal passing grades. A funder could limit any new loan funds
until these measures are met, thus limiting uncontrolled
growth. Credit officers would be more careful with client
selection. In one World Vision–established MFI, the credit
officers in one branch worked hard to exceed loan disburse
ment quotas, but portfolio quality was poor. The MFI’s branch
office was threatened with closing down unless it improved the
portfolio quality.
It is much easier for MFIs to find new clients than to get
money back from clients in arrears, but credit officers must
focus on the latter. By focusing on poor loan decisions, credit
officers and the entire MFI can learn from mistakes. The risk
of limiting loans until the Portfolio at Risk (over one day)
rate meets certain targets is that portfolio growth could stag
nate, which could discourage credit officers. In fact, arrears
may increase because the portfolio (denominator in the statis
tics) is dwindling. The MFI managers will need to balance the
follow-up on the collection of late loans with the review of
some new loans.
If the two Portfolio at Risk rates are very large, the MFI
should also consider establishing a special incentive program
for credit officers to collect very late loans. If it is part of a
time-fixed recovery program, the institution could pay 5 percent of payments received from late payers. An alternative is to
give an equal share of the incentive payment received to each
credit officer.
For very late loans (group loans over five weeks without a
payment, individual loans at sixty days without a payment),
credit officers should visit each late payer. The credit officer
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should classify the client into one of the four following categories:
(1) willing and able to repay, (2) willing but unable to repay,
(3) unwilling but able to repay, and (4) unwilling and unable
to repay.
With the institution’s management, the following courses
of action could be considered.
Willing and Able to Repay. Management could allow credit
officers to receive payment, even partial payment, at the
client’s business or home. The Georgia Credit Fund imple
mented this alternative by having the credit officer and the
supervisor visit the client’s business.
Willing but Unable to Repay. Rescheduling should be con
sidered for clients with a very good excuse. This means that the
principal, interest due, and penalty due are added up as the
starting balance on a new loan, for which the client signs a new
loan contract. Rescheduling can, however, hide a problem that
can resurface in a worse condition, even encouraging delin
quency. The day of reckoning comes when repayments start
again. The MFI does not have any guarantee that late payments
will not occur again. The Georgia Credit Fund reports that
rescheduling has caused difficulty for many clients because the
profitability of the businesses did not improve. They are now
pursuing possible partial liquidation of the collateral together
with rescheduling.
Unwilling but Able to Repay. The institution can pursue
legal action or inform the community and influential persons
of clients’ unwillingness to repay. Their names can be publicly
posted. Religious and community leaders can push them to
pay. Community leaders can be informed that the MFI will
stop lending in the neighborhood if arrears are too high. The
entire neighborhood could lose because of several persons’
unwillingness to honor their legal obligations. Handing clients
over to debt collectors should be considered, but the institution
then loses most of its leverage. If the MFI visits the client, all
funds still go through the debt collector, which is very hard for
the MFI to track. Also, most collectors’ microenterprise clients
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are smaller than their other clients. They may spend more time
frying larger fish and leave microenterprise clients’ files
untouched. Another option is to train staff in debt collection;
perhaps an attorney could help the MFI develop this capacity.
Unwilling and Unable to Repay. Following up on such
groups is a poor use of staff time. They are best referred to debt
collectors or written off.
Credit officers and their supervisors in several MFIs have
found this “triage” activity very helpful in serious arrears situa
tions. They can determine where to invest significant staff time
(willing and able and unwilling but able quadrants) to yield the
most improvement in the repayment of payments in arrears.

Conclusion
There is no magic recipe to reduce arrears. Often it is just plain
hard work. First, prevention is always better than cure, so a
clear understanding by the client that arrears will not be toler
ated is key to keeping the situation from getting out of hand.
Second, MFIs need to have clear and effective credit poli
cies and procedures approved by the board of directors that are
followed by credit officers. If the policies and procedures are
not effective, then the credit officers need to have a hand in
creating new ones.
Third, management and credit officers need to pay attention
to details. The average arrears rate of each credit officer’s portfolio should be tracked weekly or biweekly.
Credit officers must respond quickly to problem clients in
their portfolios. The credit supervisor must respond quickly to
solve credit officer problems. A microfinance portfolio with
very low arrears can, within a few months, exhibit a dramatic
rise in arrears, which can destroy the MFI. It is very important
that practitioners watch carefully that policies are followed
once they are put in place. If things are not working, then the
institution needs to identify the problem areas and fix them
quickly. The alternative is bankruptcy.
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If an MFI can reduce arrears and get the basics of finance
right, then the organization’s overall goals will likely make a
significant contribution to the economic development of the
poor people in a country. While reducing arrears is not the
only determinant in the successful sustainability of MFIs, it is
an important building block.

Notes
1. World Vision’s Area Development Program (ADP) approach to develop
ment came about because of its all-inclusive nature. Instead of covering just a few
villages, an ADP could cover a whole geographical area or an area within clearly
defined political boundaries such as districts, provinces, etc. This means that the
program would be larger, with 500 to 10,000 children and populations of 10,000
to 50,000 who benefit. Also, the ADP approach provides opportunities for longterm assistance. Program life has increased from a range of three to seven years
to twelve to fifteen years. This came about as a result of the realization that
development is a process that takes a long time. Genuine transformation takes
years and should impact entire communities to be considered sustainable.
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Assessing the Need
For Microenterprises
in Mexico to Borrow
Start-up Capital
by Heikki Heino
and José A. Pagán
Abstract: Mexico’s microenterprises employ about 20 percent of the
working age population in the country, and the number of microenterprises has increased substantially over the last decade. Given the
role these small business units play in employment and wealth creation, it is important to understand the profile of firms that resort to
outside start-up capital to finance their operations. Using microdata
from Mexico’s National Survey of Microenterprises (Encuesta
Nacional de Micronegocios, ENAMIN), we analyze the socioeconomic
factors related to the need for outside start-up capital. The findings
show that a relatively small number of socioeconomic factors—such as
the background of the microenterprise owner, the characteristics of the
microenterprise, the operational business sector, the geographical location of the microenterprise, and the future plans of the owner—have
important implications for the policy makers as well as for the capitalassistance tools used in fostering a microenterprise-friendly economic,
social, and operational environment.

Introduction
Over the last few years, policymakers have become increasingly interested in understanding the factors associated with
the provision of loans to microenterprises in developing countries, primarily because credit access has been recognized as an
important tool for small business economic development and
poverty reduction (Otero & Rhyne, 1994; World Bank, 1996).
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At the end of 1995, about 26 billion dollars in loans to
individuals and groups were outstanding by nearly 1,000
microfinance institutions in developing countries, including
Mexico (World Bank, 1996). Private banks and cooperatives—
which encompass the formal lending sector—were responsible
for most of these loans (about 78 percent of the total loans outstanding). Nonetheless, informal lending sources—such as
loans from friends or moneylenders—are still a substantial
source of credit.
The economic significance of microenterprises is that they
substantially contribute to the overall employment level in
both developing and developed countries (de Wit, 1993).
(Microenterprise is defined as a business with fewer than six
employees or fewer than 16 in manufacturing sector. This definition is consistent with that employed in other studies in the
development and microfinance literature, for example
Sánchez, 1998, and Otero & Rhyne, 1994.) This economic
importance—coupled with the electoral power of microenterprise
owners—contributes to the increasing political power of
microenterprise owners collectively in the fiscal and political
process. It is also recognized that microenterprises represent
the “backbone” of the local economies in less developed countries such as Mexico. In particular, the economic and social
role of microenterprises is more important the less developed
a country is (Liargovas, 1998).
In Mexico, about 6.6 million microenterprises existed in
1995—having grown from about 5.7 million (or 15.7%) since
1991. Further, in the same year, owners of microenterprises
accounted for 20 percent of Mexico’s workforce (Sánchez, 1998).
The economic importance of the microenterprise sector in
Mexico has been recognized by scholars and policymakers (e.g.,
INEGI, 1994; Sánchez-Schwarz, 1996; Chaves & Sánchez,
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forthcoming). In 1995, according to data from the National
Employment Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, ENE),
38.7% of employed individuals worked in firms employing 51 or
more workers, 7.9% were employed in firms with 16 to 50
employees, 3% in firms employing 11 to 15 workers, 6% in firms
with 6 to 10 employees, 27.7% in firms with 2 to 5 employees,
and 16.7% in firms with one worker (the owner) only. In total,
53.4% of those employed are working for microenterprises. This
high employee concentration underscores the importance of
microenterprises for the economy of Mexico.
Given the importance of microenterprises for employment creation in Mexico, the role of credit as seed capital for microenterprise
development is an important economic and public policy issue.
Although much has been written regarding factors that influence
the supply of borrowed seed capital for microenterprises, both in
general and in Mexico (see, for example, Evans & Jovanovich,
1989; Edwards, 1995; McCrary, 1991; and Liargovas, 1998), little
has been written regarding factors that influence the demand for
seed capital among microenteprises. This article sheds light on the
factors that determine the demand for borrowed seed capital
among microenterprises in Mexico. Factors examined include the
owner’s socioeconomic background, microenterprise specific
characteristics, sector of operation, location of operation, and
characteristics that predict microenterprise dynamics (contingency). Such an analysis further aids us in identifying the relationship between borrowed start-up capital and the creation of
microenterprises and in identifying and formulating policy
mechanism and investment strategies that the policy makers and
private sector entities can pursue to increase the creation and survival of Mexican microenterprises.
The next section introduces the conceptual framework necessary for the formulation of the model used to analyze the data; we
describe the survey methodology and data included in the sample.
In the results section we discuss the findings of the data analysis
and follow this with concluding remarks and policy
recommendations.
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Methodology
To analyze empirically the factors related to the need for outside financing to start up a firm, a probit model can be used
(Greene, 1997). The choice to borrow or not to borrow the
start-up capital is a discrete choice; it involves an “either-or”
situation. The decision is a choice between two alternatives,
similar in nature to why some high school graduates decide to
attend college and others do not. Assume that the decision of a
microenterprise owner to select outside start-up financing is
based on an analysis of the expected marginal benefits and the
expected marginal costs of receiving these funds. That is, the
owner of a microenterprise derives certain utility from the outcome of the choice. The probit model for discrete choice is a
nonlinear (in the factors) statistical model that achieves this
objective by relating the choice probability to explanatory
variables in such way that the probability remains in the [0, 1]
interval, and it estimates the probability of relating the
explanatory variables to the need to seek outside seed capital.
The factors associated with the decision to seek outside
start-up capital to become a microentrepreneur will be analyzed
using microdata from Mexico’s National Survey of
Microenterprises (Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios,
ENAMIN), conducted every two years by the Mexican
National Statistical Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística,
Geografía e Informática, INEGI). The survey was constructed
by selecting 12,243 owners of microenterprises from urban
areas (defined as an area with at least 100,000 inhabitants) and
operating in four major economic sectors: manufacturing, commerce, services, and construction. Microenterprises were
selected randomly from the last quarter of the 1993 National
Urban Employment Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo
Urbano, ENEU). The survey examines reasons for becoming
self-employed, income, capital structure, costs, enterprise problems, credit needs, migrant status, and employment patterns,
among other factors. The ENAMIN definition of a microenterprise is consistent with the definition used by authors.
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The ENEU represents about 92% of the urban employed
population that were at least 12 years of age in 1993. The 16
urban areas surveyed in both the ENEU and the ENAMIN
were Cd. Júarez, Chihuahua, Cd. México, Guadalajara, León,
Matamoros, Mérida, Monterrey, Nuevo Laredo, Orizaba,
Puebla, San Luis Potosí, Tampico, Tijuana, Torreón, and
Veracruz. A total of 10,434 individuals/business—of 41,389
households—were identified from these urban areas (85% of
12,243 owners). In addition, 386 individuals/businesses—from
a total of 1,080 households—completed the survey from a supplemental sample of 18 smaller urban areas, totaling 10,820
micoenterprise owners (total response rate of 88%). A stratified random sample probability method was used to select the
self-employed and microenterprise owners from the urban
areas.
The sampling unit in both the ENEU and the ENAMIN is
the household. Households were selected through a three-step
process. In the first stage, households were grouped according
to socioeconomic status (high, medium, or low) into segments
of usually five households. Within each segment, the sampling
units were distributed proportionally to the total number of
households. The second stage was then to select blocks of 20 to
50 households. A proper weighting factor was then applied so
the results of statistical analyses could be generalized to the
general population in the urban areas selected. Third, households with microenterprise owners were surveyed, either at the
individual’s home or in the business premises (person to person interview; not mail-in survey).
For the purposes of conducting statistical analyses and the
testing of hypotheses—and following Sánchez (1998) and
Maloney and Cuningham (1998)—variables can be constructed
and classified into the following categories: characteristics of
the microenterprise owner, characteristics of the microenterprise, sector of operation, location of residence or operation, and firm dynamics.
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To test whether the need for outside financing depends on the
measures stated above, data from the ENAMIN survey are used.
Table 1 reports the definitions of the variables and descriptive statistics of the variables. Almost 40% of individuals in the sample
reported a need for outside financing, which takes the form of
either financing obtained from formal sources such as banks and
cooperatives, or informal sources such as friends, family members, and other informal lenders.
Table 1. Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Characteristics of the owner

Mean

Years of schooling

Std Deviation

7.523

5.484

Age

43.511

13.303

Age squared/100

20.702

12.474

Married (1 = yes)

0.708

0.455

Female (1 = yes)

0.224

0.417

Migrant (1 = yes)

0.110

0.313

Involuntary entry into self-employment (1 = yes)

0.141

0.348

Years in business

10.567

12.607

Capital or equipment (in Pesos)

31.823

95.223

1.779

1.360

Characteristics of the microenterprise

Labor (number of employees)

Sector of operation
Commerce (1 = yes)

0.347

0.476

Service (1 = yes)

0.425

0.494

Location of residence or operation
Center (1 = yes)

0.248

0.432

South (1 = yes)

0.139

0.346

North (1 = yes)

0.080

0.271

Border (1 = yes)

0.191

0.393

Microenterprise dynamics
Permanence in the sector (1 = yes)

0.684

0.465

Plans to expand (1 = yes)

0.212

0.408

Sells directly to public (1 = yes)
Compliance with tax authorities (1 = yes)

0.902
0.459

0.298
0.498

N
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The mean age of the entrepreneurs in the sample
(consisting of responses with no missing values) of business
owners was 43.5 years. These individuals reported an average
of 7.5 years of schooling, most of them are male and married,
and only about 11% have migrated recently to their current
region of residency. Most microenterprise owners report to be
conducting business in the service sector (42.5%) and the commerce sector (i.e., retail and wholesale trade; 34.7%). Slightly
more than one fifth of respondents are in the manufacturing
and construction sectors. From this total, roughly 6% are in
the construction sector; and for the data analysis purposes, the
construction sector respondents are merged with the respondents from the manufacturing sector. Slightly above 40% of the
microenterprises in the ENAMIN sample are located in the
Mexico City metropolitan area, with about 19.1% located in
the metropolitan areas along the U. S.-Mexico border.
About two-thirds of microenterprise owners entered the
sector to stay permanently, 21.2% plan to expand their current
size of operations, and most of these businesses sell directly to
the public as opposed to other businesses. About 54% of microenterprises can be classified as operating in the informal sector
in the sense that they operate without complying with tax
authorities (see Robaud, 1995).

Results
Table 2 reports the results of the probit model. The values of
the coefficients of the explanatory variables are grouped into
categories: the characteristics of the microenterprise owner,
characteristics of the microenterprise, sector of operation (the
base sector is the combined manufacturing/construction sector), location of residence or operation, and the microenterprise dynamics. The partial derivatives shown in Table 2
capture the impact of a one-unit change in the independent
variable on the probability of the owner of a microenterprise,
indicating a want for outside seed capital (Maddala, 1983).
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Table 2. Probit Regression Results: Need for Start-up
Financing
Variable

Coefﬁcient

Constant

Std Error

Partialsa

0.885 ***

0.189

Years of schooling

-0.013 ***

0.004

-0.005

Age

-0.047 ***

0.008

-0.018

Age squared/100

0.035 ***

0.008

0.014

Married (1 = yes)

-0.051

0.041

-0.020

Female (1 = yes)

0.198 ***

0.048

0.078

Characteristics of the owner

Migrant (1 = yes)

0.016

0.055

0.006

Involuntary entry into

0.164 ***

0.050

0.064

Years in business

0.008 ***

0.001

0.003

Capital or equipment (in Pesos)

0.001 ***

0.000

0.000

Labor (number of employess

0.028 *

0.015

0.011

Commerce (1 = yes)

-0.275 ***

0.049

-0.108

Service (1 = yes)

0.036

0.046

0.014

-0.016

0.045

-0.006

self-employment (1 = yes)
Characteristics of the microenterprise

Sector of operation

Location of residence or operation
Center (1 = yes)
South (1 = yes)

-0.057

0.056

-0.022

North (1 = yes)

-0.144 **

0.068

-0.057

Border (1 = yes)

0.129 ***

0.048

0.051

Microenterprise dynamics
Permanence in the sector (1 = yes)

0.100 ***

0.039

0.039

Plans to expand (1 = yes)

0.237 ***

0.047

0.093

Sells directly to the public (1 = yes)

0.170 ***

0.059

0.067

Compliance with tax authorities (1 = yes)

-0.126 ***

0.041

-0.049

N

5,818

Chi-squared (df = 20)

208.818 ***

Veall and Zimmermann’s Pseudo-R 2

0.050

*/**/*** signiﬁcant at the ten percent, ﬁve percent, and one percent level, respectively.
a
Evaluated at the mean values of the independent variables.
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Before discussing the main findings, note that the model
fits the data well, as can be deduced from a Chi-square statistic
of 208.818, suggesting that the null hypothesis of a zero vector
of coefficients is rejected at the one percent level of statistical
significance. Moreover, the Veall and Zimmermann’s (1996)
Pseudo-R 2 measures further reinforce this result.
The owners’ need for outside start-up capital decreases
with increasing levels of schooling and age. Age also proxies
experience, following the method of calculation found in other
studies (Davila, 1997; age less years of schooling less 16). An
additional year of schooling decreases the probability of needing outside financing by roughly half a percentage point, and
each additional year of experience (age) decreases the probability of needing outside seed capital by 1.8 percentage points.
With increasing years of schooling and experience, the need for
outside start-up capital diminishes with the assumable increase
in personal wealth accumulation. Moreover, education may be
used as a proxy for the more general ability to acquire savings
and new capital (Nabi, 1989).
Female microenterprise owners are more likely to resort to
outside financing for start-up capital. These results are consistent with those of other studies which have found that on
average, self-employed females are older than their male
counterparts, perhaps because they face labor market barriers
that hinder their ability to accumulate funds to start a business.
Female entrepreneurs are also less likely to be married than
their male counterparts, and therefore could have less of a
financial support network than male business owners (Pagán &
Sánchez, forthcoming; Maloney & Cunningham, 1998).
If people start a business because they cannot find salaried
employment or they were fired from the last salaried positions
(involuntary entry into self-employment), the need for outside
start-up capital seems to be important.
Business experience in years (not limited to the planned
enterprise), stock of capital (in pesos), and the expected number
of employees—i.e., characteristics of the microenterprise—are all
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statistically significant and positively related to the need for outside start-up capital. It is reasonable to assume that the more
business experience owners have the more personal wealth they
have accumulated. The findings are consistent with the premise
that there is a positive relationship between the probability of
starting a business and the size of personal assets, as stated by
Evans and Jovanovic (1989).
The expected number of paid employees is also positively
related to the need for outside start-up capital. This finding is
consistent with the economics and finance literature, which
indicates that the rate of expected return either increases with
firm size—measured by number of paid employees—or is fixed
(constant) with the firm size (Evans & Jovanovic, 1989).
Microenterprise owners in the commerce sector are less
likely to need outside financing when compared to those in all
other sectors (relative to the manufacturing = base sector).
In the border region the probability for a start-up microenterprise needing outside financing is greater than in the central, south, or northern regions of Mexico.
With regard to microenterprise dynamics, if the owners of
microenterprises indicate the desire for the future expansion of
their firms (plans to expand) or that they are going to stay in
the current place of business or residency (permanence in the
sector), the likelihood of relying on outside start-up capital
significantly increases when compared to owners who do not
have these types of plans. Additionally, when owners of
microenterprises are in compliance with authorities (legal, tax,
and labor) then the likelihood of outside start-up capital
reliance significantly falls.

Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
The largest percentage (66.8) of the individuals entering into
self-employment through the creation of a microenterprise
used personal savings to do so (Heino, 2000). The age of the
owner, years of schooling, gender, involuntary entry into selfemployment, years of owner’s business experience, accumulated
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capital, and planned size of the firm (as implied by the number
of paid employees) are factors affecting the individual’s need
for outside start-up capital.
The sector of the operation as well as the geographic
region of the microenterprise are similarly found to be statistically significant explanatory variables that affect the microenterprise owner’s need for outside start-up capital. For
example, owners planning to create a microenterprise in the
Mexico City area are more likely to need outside capital to
help them to get started, as compared with entrepreneurs in
other areas of the country. Similarly, an entrepreneur entering
into self-employment in the manufacturing and construction
sector will more likely need outside start-up capital compared
to an entrepreneur in the commerce sector.
Policymakers in both developed and less developed countries seem to use two basic policy measures to fuel the creation
of microenterprises (Heino, 2000). The two policy tools used—
in order to create an economic and social framework favorable
to the birth and survival of microenterprises—rely on a variation of capital assistance for seed capital (e.g., globally subsidized loans, guaranty schemes, and direct financial support to
nongovernmental organizations and on fiscal policy tools,
organizing educational seminars, and other entrepreneurial
training opportunities). The direct financial assistance
approach without the increase in supportive policy actions that
focus on incentives and services, structural improvements (not
only in the capital markets), and cooperation between governmental (on federal, state, and local levels) and nongovernmental
organizations seems to be increasing in importance. This conclusion furthers the belief that most, if not all, interventions
by monetary or fiscal policy makers have a limited and at best
short-term desired effect in the increasingly integrated global
economies. It is also interesting to note that macro-level policy
measures aimed to increase the competitiveness of the institutions in the informal credit sector could make microfinance services very attractive to a large number of potential
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microenterprise owners. This would allow the informal sector
institutions to provide the same services as formal credit-sector
institutions at a more affordable price and with greater flexibility, resulting in a more homogenous competitive environment to all start-up microenterprises. Theoretically, this
should increase the expected demand by the potential owners
of microenterprises for borrowed start-up capital; and this
demand will lead to an increased creation of microenterprises
(which would also lead to increasing economic benefits to the
surrounding communities) when the cost of start-up capital
incrementally approaches the cost of starting a firm with personal savings (i.e., cost equals the foregone interest income
from savings account). The use of macro-level policy measures
aimed to “equalize” the cost of start-up capital across formal
and informal sectors—without balancing the policy measures
with measures aimed to ensure the existence of efficient capital
markets, in which participants, small and large alike, have free
(without restrictions) and equal access to the markets—is thus
a fundamental requirement in establishing an economic environment that fosters growth.

Notes
In comparing formal sector borrowers to informal sector borrowers in Mexico,
Heino (2000) found that a likely borrower from the formal credit markets differentiates from the likely owner of the microenterprise who borrows from the informal
credit sector in the average years of schooling (formal sector borrowers are 66.2%
more educated in terms of school years), the number of paid employees (formal sector borrows have more), age (formal sector borrowers are older), and tax compliance
(formal sector borrowers are more likely to be in compliance with tax laws.
The ENAMIN survey also asked microenterprise owners why they started their
businesses (the sample is weighted and it is equivalent to the responses of 3,060,243
microenterprise owners). About 24% of microenterprise owners said that they
became self-employed in order to gain more independence; and 37% became entrepreneurs because the expected income from self-employment is greater than the
income from a salaried position. Almost 36% went into business to complement family income, 10% started a business to follow family tradition, and 8% became entrepreneurs because no other employment opportunities were available.
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Microﬁnance:
Conversations with
the Experts
edited by
Charles Oberdorf
by Matthew Wood
I have always been impressed by how microenterprise captures
the strange mixture of idealism and practicality that makes
moral action possible. When speaking of the poor—of the
issues embedded within the microenterprise endeavor—too
often our words become bounded by rhetoric, and the por
trayal of real world solutions becomes skewed in favor of per
sonal and institutional opinions. Through simple candor,
Conversations with Experts avoids this common pitfall and
offers the reader a glimpse into the daily decisions that weave
ideals and action together.
In contrast to political and intellectual practicality, where
opposing imperatives are blended into generally ineffective
moderation, the real world practicality detailed in Conversations
demonstrates that institutional practicality is very heteroge
neous. The moral actions pursued by the institutions referred
to in Conversations are concurrently radical and pedestrian,
concurrently ground in market and social policy agendas. For
example, it would be incorrect to characterize Rosalind
Copisarow’s efforts in Eastern Europe as the market-based
approach and Vijay Mahahan’s Basix as the poverty-alleviation
approach. Neat, opposable dichotomies aren’t to be found.

Journal of Microfinance

What can be seen is how the metric of final analysis,
espoused by an institution, impacts the direction of future
institutional growth. Institutions that pursue the ultimate for
malization of microfinance into the greater economy first, and
poverty alleviation as a by-product of process second, are pre
sented, over time, with a different set of possibilities than insti
tutions that pursue poverty alleviation first and market
formality second.
Institutions cannot survive as fence-sitters. Business-critical
processes must to be defined. Strategy must be pursued.
Conversations provides a glimpse into not only the cultural
variability of microfinance institutions, but also a view of the
real-world incarnations of ideological differences. Although
the microfinance institutions represented in this read draw
adaptively on a spectrum of ideals, at the end of the day, or bet
ter put, at the end of the quarter, metrics of performance must
be generated.
As the field of microcredit has evolved from a marginal
social movement into the economic reality of microfinance
institutions, the focal point of practitioner and intellectual
analysis is the institutional imperative. Above all, for microfinance to succeed, the institution must be tended to.
Conversations reiterates this imperative through its collective
practitioner experiences. Regardless whether you are modeling
efforts similar to SafeSave or Grameem, the institutional
impact of inputs, donations, client behavior, and organiza
tional structure must be monitored.
There does exist within the greater microfinance environ
ment a rationale for defining a common set of metrics for all
microfinance institutions. This book illustrates that not only is
this unlikely, but inappropriate. The legitimate institutional
heterogeneity that Conversations captures implies the need for
institution-specific metrics.
Matthew Wood works in the area of Organizational Strategy and Design for Tavant
Technologies. Matthew also works promoting literacy in developing countries. He is
currently planning to work in Vientiane Laos to promote a literacy project there.
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Microfinance: Conversations with the Experts provides a
valuable sampling of institutional paradigms and best practices.
It foreshadows an increasing variability of microfinance insti
tutions, coupled with an increasing client, culture, and value
relevance.
Publisher: Calmeadow-Accion, 1999. A Microenterprise Policy Institute
publication. ISBN:0921340060
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